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 Among the most prominent contributions of agricultural economists to the 
development field is the analysis of issues in commodity marketing. The topics 
include the role of competition among market intermediaries in determining 
marketing margins, analysis of price risks and the theory of commodity price 
stabilization. This dissertation consists of three essays on coffee markets that provide 
empirical evidence on three marketing issues widely debated by development 
practitioners: the impact of domestic policy on producer prices, the relationship 
between producer prices and competition among traders, and the use of informal risk 
management tools by farmers.  
 The first essay evaluates the impact of coffee sector reforms on producer 
prices in a number of coffee producing countries. With the help of cointegration 
analysis the essay establishes that the reforms produced a closer relationship between 
the domestic and world prices. Estimation of an error-correction model reveals that 
  
transmission of price signals from the world market to domestic producers has also 
improved. However, in some countries there is evidence of asymmetry in the way 
positive and negative world price changes are transmitted to domestic markets. 
 The second paper investigates the role of competition in the marketing sector 
for prices received by growers in India. In the case of Robusta, the empirical evidence 
is that competition among traders plays an important role in determining prices to 
growers, while there is no such evidence for Arabica. Membership in a cooperative 
has a significant impact on prices in some cases. The analysis also points towards the 
value of education since those with university education receive higher prices. The 
choice of marketing intermediary has different implications for prices depending on 
the type of coffee traded.  
 The third essay concludes that in absence of formal risk hedging instruments 
risk averse farmers do take actions to reduce income uncertainty: growers that are risk 
averse are more likely to be members of cooperatives, are less likely to carry over 
































Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 












Dr. Bruce Gardner, Chair 
Dr. Richard Just 
Dr. Ramón López 
Dr. Kenneth Leonard 
























© Copyright by 



















To my Dani, my most ambitious project so far, to my mom for always being there for 





I am thankful to my dissertation advisor, Dr. Bruce Gardner, for guidance, 
support and valuable inputs to this dissertation. I would also like to thank Dr. Richard 
Just for extensive discussions and contributions to Chapter 4. 
Acknowledgement goes to the Commodity Risk Management Group (CRMG) 
of the World Bank which generously provided the survey data used in this 
dissertation. Finally, I would also like to thank the staff of the International Coffee 




Table of Contents 
 
 
Dedication ..................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements...................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents......................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. vii 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Motivation..................................................................................................... 1 
1. 2 Dissertation objectives .................................................................................. 3 
1.2.1 Producer prices and structural reforms ................................................. 4 
1.2.2 Producer prices and domestic marketing .............................................. 5 
1.2.3 Risk aversion and informal risk management....................................... 6 
1.3 Main findings ................................................................................................ 7 
1.4 The structure of the dissertation.................................................................... 8 
Chapter 2: The impact of coffee market reforms on producer prices and price 
transmission .................................................................................................................. 9 
2.1 Introduction................................................................................................... 9 
2.2 Empirical literature on price transmission .................................................. 11 
2.3 The extent of coffee market reforms........................................................... 14 
2.4 Methodology............................................................................................... 16 
2.5 Data ............................................................................................................. 19 
2. 6 Estimation results........................................................................................ 20 
2. 7 Discussion ................................................................................................... 23 
2. 8 Conclusions................................................................................................. 26 
Appendix 2.A: Coffee market reforms by country ............................................. 36 
Appendix 2.B: Derivation of the degree of adjustment ...................................... 46 
Chapter 3: Producer prices and trader competition: the case of coffee in India ......... 48 
3.1 Introduction................................................................................................. 48 
3.2 Marketing margins and market power:  the evidence................................. 49 
3.3 Coffee production and marketing in India .................................................. 54 
3.3.1 Production and processing .................................................................. 54 
3.3.2 Marketing............................................................................................ 56 
3.3.3 Policy .................................................................................................. 58 
3.4 Methodology............................................................................................... 60 
3.5 Data ............................................................................................................. 66 
3.6 Estimation results........................................................................................ 70 
3.7 Conclusions................................................................................................. 76 
Chapter 4: Attitude to risk and informal insurance..................................................... 87 
4.1 Introduction................................................................................................. 87 
4.2 Existing evidence on risk aversion and participation in insurance ............. 90 
4.3 Sources of income volatility and risk management tools ........................... 93 




4.3.2 Strategies for managing income risks ................................................. 97 
4.4 Methodology............................................................................................... 99 
4.5 Data ........................................................................................................... 106 
4.6 Empirical results ....................................................................................... 108 
4.7 Willingness to pay for price insurance and education .............................. 113 
4.8 Conclusions............................................................................................... 114 
Appendix 4.A: Variance of income under price insurance............................... 130 
Chapter 5:  Concluding remarks ............................................................................... 133 
5.1 Summary of results ................................................................................... 133 
5.2 Policy implications.................................................................................... 135 
5.3 Directions for future research ................................................................... 136 





This Table of Contents is automatically generated by MS Word, linked to the 










List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Structural reforms in the coffee sector.................................................... 29 
Table 2.2 Coffee exports by country, shares (quantity) .......................................... 30 
Table 2.3 Stationarity of the producer and the world prices ................................... 31 
Table 2.4 Cointegration between domestic and world prices ................................. 32 
Table 2.5 Error-correction model with asymmetric price transmission.................. 33 
Table 2.6 Adjustment to a one-time change in the world price .............................. 35 
Table 3.1 Marketing and farm size ......................................................................... 80 
Table 3.2 Marketing and source of information ..................................................... 80 
Table 3.3 Ease of switching buyer, distance to nearest town and altitude.............. 80 
Table 3.4 Average producer price share by coffee type ......................................... 80 
Table 3.5 Determinants of farm-gate prices: All coffee ......................................... 81 
Table 3.6 Determinants of producer price share: All coffee................................... 81 
Table 3.8 Determinants of producer price share: Unwashed Robusta.................... 82 
Table 3.9 Determinants of farm-gate prices: Washed Robusta .............................. 83 
Table 3.10 Determinants of producer price share: Washed Robusta.................... 83 
Table 3.11 Determinants of farm-gate prices: Unwashed Arabica....................... 84 
Table 3.12 Determinants of producer price share: Unwashed Arabica ................ 84 
Table 3.14 Determinants of producer price share: Washed Arabica .................... 85 
Table 3.16 Probit estimation: Ease of switching buyers....................................... 86 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics................................................................................ 120 
Table 4.2 Accepted premiums for price insurance ............................................... 121 
Table 4.3 Break even insurance premiums under risk neutrality, E(Z) ................ 122 
Table 4.4 Price expectations and E(Z) .................................................................. 122 
Table 4.5 Accepted premiums for price insurance and E(Z) ................................ 123 
Table 4.6 Share of risk averse farmers.................................................................. 123 
Table 4.7 Risk aversion and farm size .................................................................. 124 
Table 4.8 Risk aversion and income diversification ............................................. 125 
Table 4.9 Risk aversion and self-insurance .......................................................... 126 
Table 4.10 Risk aversion and ways of dealing with income decline .................. 127 
Table 4.11 Risk aversion and realized price ....................................................... 128 
Table 4.12 Maximum acceptable premiums and education................................ 129 




List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 The ratio of producer price to world price .......................................... 28 
Figure 3.1 Producer and wholesale Arabica prices in India................................. 79 
Figure 3.2 Producer and wholesale Robusta prices in India ................................ 79 
Figure 4.1 Coffee production in India, 1986-2006............................................. 117 
Figure 4.2 Coffee yields in India, 1986-2006 .................................................... 117 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
 Coffee is a major commodity traded internationally which generated 
US$9,116 billion in global export revenue in 2006 (FAO). Most coffee is grown in 
developing countries and consumed in the industrialized world. Approximately 17-20 
million households in more than 50 nations grow coffee and, by some accounts, as 
much as 100 million people benefit from coffee trade (Lewin et. al. 2004). Most 
coffee growers are smallholders with low incomes and high level of exposure to risks. 
The price received for coffee is perhaps the single most important determinant of 
coffee growers’ welfare. In the past, coffee prices to producers have been regulated 
by the governments of the coffee producing countries through extensive interventions 
in coffee marketing and export activities. Price stabilization, although costly and 
often inefficient, was motivated by the desire of the governments to protect coffee 
growers’ incomes from price fluctuations, but in most cases imposed a large wedge 
between international prices and local prices paid to growers. When commodity 
market reforms were introduced with the objective to improve the efficiency of 
domestic marketing, the share of producer prices in the world market price increased, 
but at the time producers became more exposed to risks associated with the volatility 
of international prices. 
 The drastic decline of international coffee prices in 2001 and 2002 below 60 




disastrous implications for incomes of smallholder coffee growers across the world. 
Coffee prices plummeted below production costs, chiefly as the result of global 
oversupply, causing severe financial losses for coffee farms. Since most coffee 
farmers are smallholders, the price crash had an immediate and widespread effect on 
poverty levels, causing devastation in coffee growing communities through the 
impact on consumption, education and healthcare. The World Bank estimates 
economic losses for small coffee farmers to be at around US$4.5 billion per year 
during the crisis (Lewin et. al., 2004). Facing uncertainty regarding future prices and 
lacking safety nets many growers abandoned plantations and sought other 
opportunities. Employment in the coffee sector plummeted by more than 50% in 
some countries (Varangis et. al., 2003). Coffee export revenues also declined in 
producing countries, with negative consequences for fiscal accounts and balance of 
payment. 
 With the coffee price crisis acting as a catalyst, the governments and 
international community had to come up with strategies for restoring the balance and 
bringing the coffee industry on a sustainable path. The strategies proposed in 
response to the crisis relied on increasing the value-added of green coffee through 
improvements to quality and consistency of coffee, product diversification, both in 
and out of coffee, the use of differentiated markets (specialty and Geographic 
Indicators of Origin, organic, fair trade, shade grown etc.), use of supply contracts, 
standards and certification (Varangis et. al. 2003, Lewin et.al. 2004). However, both 
the industry and policy makers recognize that revival of prices and tapping into niche 




on rural development is needed to provide viable alternatives for on-farm and off-
farm income generation. 
 These survival strategies were discussed in the international community 
during numerous roundtables, and various initiatives to support producers, both at 
international and national levels, were launched. These initiatives were based on a 
growing number of policy discussion papers and qualitative studies that rely on 
aggregate data and anecdotal evidence to explain the dynamics of producer prices and 
their implications for coffee growers. The empirical evidence on factors affecting 
producer prices in the coffee growing countries is scarce. 
 Motivated by the tremendous importance of prices for the welfare of coffee 
growers, this thesis focuses on determinants of producer prices and the approaches for 
dealing with price risks. A number of research questions are addressed. First, what is 
the relationship between producer prices and the prices of coffee traded 
internationally? Second, how do the characteristics of domestic marketing affect that 
relationship? Are there any specific constraints that farmers face that prevent them 
from extracting full benefits from participation in the global markets? In many 
countries growers report concerns with increasing market power of traders, constrains 
in access to market information and high exposure to risk. Third, what is the role of 
policy and regulation in improving market efficiency? Fourth, what are the sources of 
income uncertainty and what do farmers do or might do to mitigate risks?  
1. 2 Dissertation objectives 
 This dissertation examines the relationship between farm-gate coffee prices 




of this research is to contribute to understanding the determinants of producer prices 
as well as actions that growers take to protect themselves from price fluctuations. 
Specifically, the dissertation focuses on two issues that affect functioning of coffee 
markets and contribute to formation of farm-gate prices: domestic policy and 
competition among traders. In addition, the use of price risk management tools is 
analyzed. For each of these topics a different set of questions is addressed, using 
methodology appropriate to each, as briefly outlined below. 
1.2.1 Producer prices and structural reforms 
Between late 1980’s and mid 1990’s most coffee exporting countries 
implemented reform packages that transformed state-controlled marketing into 
market-based trading systems. Typically, the reforms contained the following key 
components: (i) Withdrawal of state trading enterprises from direct marketing; (ii) 
Allowing entry of private agents into coffee purchasing, domestic marketing and 
export activities and encouraging competition among traders; (iii) Abandoning 
guaranteed minimum prices and (iv) Lowering or eliminating export taxes. 
 While market liberalization spurred entry of private traders and emergence of 
new institutions and organizations, its success in terms of improving market 
efficiency and creating better conditions for growers has been disputable. Some 
concerns have been raised regarding the emergence of private monopolistic 
competition in domestic markets and the market power of multinational coffee traders 
and roasters. The nature of post-reform competition among market intermediaries 
plays an important role as it influences markups in the sector and thus directly affects 




 The principal question posed in Chapter 2 is whether the reforms were 
successful in obtaining the declared goals of raising producer prices and improving 
price transmission from international markets to the farm gate. To investigate that 
question, an error-correction model with a structural break is applied to time series 
data on prices for thirteen countries. Based on this model, short-run price 
transmission, the speed of adjustment and the share of producer price in the world 
price are estimated to assess the impact of the structural reforms. In addition, 
asymmetry of price transmission is tested in both periods to check whether price 
increases were passed through to producers as fast as price decreases and whether the 
nature of the asymmetry has changed after the reforms. 
1.2.2 Producer prices and domestic marketing 
A coffee marketing channel typically consists of several important stages such 
as collection of coffee at farm-gate or village level; transport; processing; storage; 
wholesale transaction; and exporting. While each marketing activity is necessary for 
production of the final good, which is green coffee for export, and therefore generates 
significant value-added, an issue that potentially could have important implications 
for the size of the marketing margin is the level of competition among market 
intermediaries. Each of the marketing stages may be characterized by oligopsonistic 
competition among marketing agents, especially if entry to the activity is restricted. 
An issue commonly raised by coffee growers is that the market power of traders, 
combined with constrained flow of market information in the sector, leave growers at 




 Chapter 3 investigates the roles of competition among market intermediaries 
in determining the spread between export prices of coffee and prices received by 
growers, utilizing a survey of coffee producers in the state of Karnataka in India. A 
simple model with oligopsony in the marketing sector is developed and tested to 
determine the impact of trader competition on producer prices. A number of other 
factors are considered, such as the type of marketing channel, availability of price 
information and membership in cooperatives. 
1.2.3 Risk aversion and informal risk management 
Understanding how prices affect coffee growers requires taking into 
consideration price volatility and the importance of price risk for producers’ welfare. 
Extensive empirical research shows that farmers are overwhelmingly risk averse, and 
it is therefore natural to assume that they would benefit from price hedging 
instruments. However, the implementation of these instruments in coffee growing 
countries has been slow. One of the reasons is insufficient interest from producers. To 
better understand the incentives for coffee grower participation in price insurance, 
two questions are of relevance: First, are coffee growers risk averse, as the empirical 
and experimental literature involving other smallholder farmers indicates? Second, 
what type of risk reducing and consumption smoothing strategies do farmers apply in 
the absence of a formal insurance? 
 Chapter 4 develops a framework for deriving growers’ risk preferences from 
the responses on maximum premiums that growers would be willing to pay for price 
insurance. Using the same survey data from Karnataka in India, as in Chapter 3, the 




tested empirically to establish whether risk averse growers resort to self-insurance for 
risk mitigation or consumption smoothing in the absence of formal insurance. 
1.3 Main findings 
The main contributions of this thesis are empirical findings establishing: (i) 
the relationship between producer prices and domestic policy (ii) the relationship 
between producer prices and characteristics of the marketing sector and (iii) the 
relationship between risk aversion and risk-mitigating activities of farmers. As such, 
this dissertation is intended to contribute to the ongoing debate on policies and 
instruments intended to raise the incomes of coffee growing households. 
 The principal finding of the first essay, based on time series data for selected 
coffee producing countries, is that in most countries the reforms were successful in 
raising the ratio of producer price to the world market price and enhancing price 
transmission from international markets to farm-gate. Producer prices adjust faster to 
changes in world market prices today than prior to market liberalization, and the 
effect is stronger in countries where reforms were more far-reaching. However, in 
some cases asymmetric price transmission is detected, so that in the post-reform 
period price increases are transmitted slower than price declines. 
 The main conclusion in the second essay is that competition among growers 
matters for producer prices, but only in the case of Robusta coffee, the most 
homogeneous of the two types of coffee produced in India. The prices of Arabica 
coffee appear to be driven more by quality than marketing arrangements. Several 
other variables affect producer prices: the type of market intermediary, the education 




 The third essay concludes that risk averse farmers do take some actions to 
reduce the adverse effects of price volatility on their welfare: growers that are risk 
averse are more likely to be members of cooperatives, do not usually carry over 
stocks to reduce exposure to price risk and are more likely to default on their loans 
when prices drop. However, they do not seem to be more likely to diversify income 
through off-farm employment and crop diversification that other growers.  
1.4 The structure of the dissertation 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 is an essay on the 
impact of structural reforms on producer prices relative to international prices. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the role of competition among traders and other characteristics 
of domestic marketing in determining prices to growers. Chapter 4 examines the case 
of price insurance and establishes the relationship between risk aversion and 
strategies used by the farmers to reduce income risk and smooth consumption. 




Chapter 2: The impact of coffee market reforms on producer 
prices and price transmission 
2.1 Introduction 
Coffee growers in developing countries receive a notoriously small share of the 
export price of green coffee. The spread varies substantially across countries, 
depending on country specific conditions such as domestic policy affecting 
production and exporting, the market structure of the marketing sector even when 
comparing countries with seemingly similar exporting systems. For example, 
producers in Tanzania received only 42% of the export price of Arabica coffee and 
30% of the price for Robusta in 1998/99 (Baffes, 2003), while in Uganda the share of 
export price accruing to growers of Robusta at the same time was 75% (CRMG, 
2002b).  
 The governments of developing countries are known for intervening 
intensively in their agricultural markets for two main reasons. One is revenue 
collection, since agriculture, often being the largest sector of the economy in terms of 
employment and exports, represents a convenient base for taxation. Another reason is 
the desire of governments to reduce producer price volatility to reduce price risks to 
producers that depend on exportable commodities for their livelihood and to manage 
food price risks for consumers. For their impact on producer welfare the stabilization 
schemes are in general regarded as unsuccessful. Varangis et. al. (2002) summarize 
the findings in the literature on reasons for failure of these schemes. The cost of 
reduced volatility seemed too high, given that the administered prices usually were 




McIntire and Varangis, 1999). Moreover, the implementation of stabilization policies 
was delegated to inefficient, overstaffed and often corrupt marketing boards. Apart 
from price stabilization through administered minimum prices and maintaining buffer 
stocks (the instruments of stabilization in developing countries are discussed in 
Claessens and Duncan,1993), these marketing boards were typically directly involved 
in domestic marketing of commodities, controlling purchasing as well as exporting, in 
effect acting as a state monopsony vis-à-vis producers. 
 Faced with costly and inefficient marketing systems and growing pressures 
from international donors to reforms agricultural commodity markets, most coffee-
growing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America implemented substantial 
liberalization of the coffee sector beginning in the mid-1980s, dissolving marketing 
boards and allowing private agents to operate as traders and exporters (for selected 
case studies that include coffee see Akiyama et.al., 2001). The pace and scope of the 
reforms varied across countries. Most countries liberalized coffee markets in late 
1980s or early 1990s by lowering export taxes and replacing state-controlled 
marketing systems with markets run by private agents. The key objectives were 
introduction of more efficient markets, lower marketing margins and higher producer 
prices.  
 This paper investigates whether the reforms were successful in raising the 
ratio of producer price to the international price of coffee and whether they improved 
the transmission of price signals from the world to domestic markets. An error-
correction model is specified to account for the dynamic nature of price adjustment. 




price share are estimated before and after the reforms. Asymmetric price transmission 
is tested in both periods to check whether price increases are passed through to 
producers as fast as price decreases and whether the nature of the asymmetry has 
changed after the reforms. 
2.2 Empirical literature on price transmission 
 Several papers investigate the responsiveness of domestic prices in developing 
countries to fluctuations in international commodity prices. The evidence of the 
relationship between world market prices and domestic prices has been mixed. The 
estimates of the elasticity of transmission from border to domestic markets seem to be 
highly sensitive to the methodology applied.  
 Hazell et. al. (1990) examine whether the volatility in the world market prices 
has been passed through to producer prices in developing countries. The authors test 
whether price instability has increased over time and whether fluctuations in domestic 
markets followed the variability of the world prices. They find that world market 
prices indeed grew more volatile over time, but that price variation was explained 
more by declining average prices than by variability around trend. The fluctuations in 
world market prices were in general transmitted to countries’ export unit values, but 
not to producer prices, since the real exchange rates and government intervention in 
agriculture played a buffering role.  
 Mundlak and Larson (1992) estimate a direct relationship between domestic 
and world market prices. Their estimates of price transmission elasticities for 58 
countries reveal almost perfect price transmission. Cross-commodity OLS for each 




regressions suggest that for most countries the elasticity of transmission is close to 
unity. Separate estimations are carried out for wheat, coffee and cocoa. Price 
transmissions in those markets are found to be lower than those obtained from the 
pool of commodities, indicating imperfections of transmission in these particular 
markets. 
 A different approach to estimating a relationship between two price time 
series is the error-correction model. Unlike the static framework, the error-correction 
model includes a dynamic component, which captures the effect of adjustment of the 
dependent variable when it deviates from its long-term equilibrium level. This 
approach is taken by Quiroz and Soto (1995), and their results differ substantially 
from the ones obtained by Mundlak and Larson. Their conclusion is that the vast 
majority of cases the international price signals are transmitted very poorly to 
domestic markets or are not transmitted at all.  
 Baffes and Gardner (2003) also use the error-correction model to estimate the 
responsiveness of domestic prices to fluctuations in the global markets. The authors 
analyze price transmission for 10 commodities on a country-by-country basis for the 
period mid 1970s to mid 1990s. Again, estimation of price adjustment suggests that 
changes in the world prices account for only a small share of the variation in domestic 
prices. The authors also assess whether policy reforms under the structural adjustment 
programs improved price transmission. Structural breaks are introduced 
corresponding to the years of substantial market reforms. The results indicate that in 




 Morisset (1997) examines the growing spread between world and domestic 
commodity prices in the consuming countries and evaluates the losses to developing 
countries caused by this spread. He finds that the gap has widened over time because 
of the asymmetric response of consumer prices to movements in the world prices. 
Throughout the period examined, the increases in the world prices have been passed 
through to consumers more fully than price decreases, causing a loss of over $100 
billion a year in export earnings for developing countries. Coffee is the sector which 
is characterized by the greatest price asymmetry. Apart from fuels, coffee is also the 
commodity which bears the greatest losses associated with the increasing price spread 
between the world prices and the domestic consumer prices.  
 This paper focuses exclusively on the coffee sector and measures the 
responsiveness of domestic producer prices to the international prices. The 
assumption is that exporting countries act as price takers on the world market. This is 
a reasonable assumption in the period following the collapse of the International 
Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989. However, even during the ICA regulatory system, 
which was designed to sustain collusion among coffee producing countries, the 
difficulties associated with negotiating and insuring compliance with the agreements 
implied meant that the countries were not able to collude perfectly. Karp and Perloff 
(1993) test the price-taking hypothesis in the case of Brazil and Colombia, the two 
largest exporters of that time. Using a dynamic feedback oligopoly model the authors 
conclude that Brazil and Colombia were closer to price taking than to collusion. 
 The essay follows the dynamic approach adopted by Quiroz and Soto (1995) 




principal question addressed is whether the reform processes in the coffee producing 
countries resulted in a closer relationship between the world market prices and the 
internal prices paid to growers. The error-correction model allows estimation of short-
run price transmission, the speed of adjustment and the share of the domestic price 
before and after the reforms. In addition, the paper tests for the existence of 
asymmetric responses to world price increases and decreases. If prior to liberalization 
neither price increases nor price decreases were fully transmitted to producers, an 
interesting question is whether the reforms affected the transmission of the upward 
and downward price movements equally. 
2.3 The extent of coffee market reforms 
 Each coffee producing country followed its own distinct liberalization path. 
The degree of liberalization, the timing and the sequencing of the reforms were 
different in each country, producing different outcomes in each case. The main 
components of the reforms by country are summarized in Table 2.1. Four types of 
countries can be identified. In many countries the reforms covered the full range of 
measures: complete withdrawal of the state from marketing, facilitation of entry of 
private traders, abolishment of minimum prices, lowering of export taxes and 
simplification of procedures for firm registration and licensing. This category 
includes Brazil, Mexico, India, Uganda, Madagascar, Togo and Cameroon.  
 The second group includes countries where some reforms took place, but the 
government retains some power over marketing, and the sector continues to be 
heavily regulated. In Kenya and Tanzania the parastatal organizations are not 




which no coffee can legally be traded outside the system. The Coffee Board of Kenya 
(CBK) remains highly influential, but the Kenya Coffee Growers and Employers 
Association (KCGEA) has called for its dissolution, demanding direct marketing of 
coffee by the growers to be permitted (East African Standard, 2003). In Tanzania, a 
large proportion of coffee is marketed by cooperative unions which maintain close 
ties to the Coffee Board and enjoy special privileges. The licensing procedures for 
coffee traders are restrictive and in 2000/2001 the Coffee Board revoked the buying 
licenses of private traders, effectively handing the monopsony power to the unions 
(Baffes, 2003).  
 In other countries, such as Ethiopia, Angola and Central African Republic, 
internal marketing is liberalized, but the government continues to exert control over 
producer prices. The Angolan National Coffee Institute announces the minimum 
prices to producers at the beginning of each season. In Ethiopia the minimum export 
differentials are set daily, but there is no floor producer price. In Central African 
Republic there are centrally controlled  indicative prices that are used as the basis for 
negotiations.  
 Finally, in the case of Colombia, the reforms of the coffee sector were very 
limited. The Federación Nacional de Cafeteros (FNC) continues to be the most 
powerful player on the market, controlling both domestic marketing and exporting 
and fixing grower prices and marketing margins. However, Colombia is a special case 





 The content and achievements of market liberalization in each country are 
described in more detail in Appendix 2.A. To get a preliminary idea of how the 
reforms affected producer prices, the shares of the domestic prices in the world prices 
before and after the reforms are shown in Figure 2.1. As expected, in almost all 
countries the producer price share increased after the reforms. The only exception is 
Tanzania, where the price share for Arabica coffee decreased slightly. This could 
potentially be due to the fact that the quality of the Tanzanian coffee has been 
decreasing in recent years. The data on coffee export by coffee grade in Ponte (2001) 
shows that the quality has been declining steadily since 1995/1996. In all other 
countries the share of producer price increased substantially, in particular in Brazil, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Mexico, Madagascar and Uganda. 
2.4 Methodology 
To test for cointegration between producer prices and world prices, an error-
correction specification is used, following Engle and Granger (1987). Error-
correction models incorporate dynamic elements into estimation of price 
transmission, allowing producer prices to adjust to their long-term equilibrium 
following a change in the world price.  
 Consider an autoregressive distributed lag model ARDL(1,1), which includes 









t pppp εβββα ++++= −− 13121      (2.1) 


























Equation (2.2) describes the variation of producer price pd in terms of an 
immediate reaction δ to a change in the world price pw and adjustment to its own 
long-term equilibrium γpw, captured by the error-correction term θ.  
 To insure that error-correction model is appropriate, I first check whether the 
time series used in the estimation are stationary. The stationarity properties of prices 
(both levels and first differences) are tested using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
procedure (ADF). In each case the hypothesis tested is that the time series follow a 
nonstationary process with a unit root. Rejecting the null hypothesis allows treating 
the time series as stationary. In addition, the existence of a long-term cointegrating 
relationship between the world and the producer prices is tested, in order to check the 
validity of the error-correction part of equation (2.2).  





t upp += γ        (2.3) 
Three OLS regressions are estimated: separate regressions before and after the 
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Note that the constant is restricted to be zero, so that the γs can be interpreted 
directly as share of producer price in the world price1. In each case an ADF test on the 
residuals is performed to determine whether the OLS results adequately describe the 
cointegrating relationship between pd and pw.  
The residuals from (2.4) are used to estimate the error-correction model with a 
structural break for each country, based on (2.2). To test for asymmetric price 
transmission another dummy variable is defined, showing whether the world price 
























t ppp 1−−=∆ . 
Both the policy dummy reftD and the dummy for price increase/decrease
∆
tD are 
used in the error-correction model. reftD is interacted with all the independent 
variables, and ∆tD is interacted with the short-run elasticity of transmission δ to test for 
the presence of asymmetric short-run price transmission. The estimated error-










































t ppp 1−−=∆ . The δs describe the short-term responsiveness of producer 
prices to world price increases and decreases before and after the reforms. The θs are 
the parameters capturing the pre- and post-reform speed of adjustment to the long-
term equilibrium in producer prices.  
                                                 




The estimated coefficients can be used to calculate how long it will take the 
producer prices to fully adjust to a one-time change in the world price. The degree of 
adjustment of the producer price relative to full adjustment n periods after the change 







−=        (2.6) 
For derivation see Appendix 2.B.   
2.5 Data 
 The data for this investigation are monthly world market prices and prices 
paid to producers in 13 coffee exporting countries from 1976 to 2004 or 2005 (data 
availability for recent years varies by country), in US cents per pound. The data are 
collected by the International Coffee Organization (ICO). Prices paid to growers are 
the farm-gate prices reported to ICO by the national coffee authorities and constitute 
the average of all grades purchased from the farmers. The exchange rates used by the 
ICO to convert the prices in local currencies to US cents are the monthly average 
exchange rates published by the IMF. 
 Prices received by the exporting countries for their coffee on the world market 
vary depending on the coffee type exported. The ”indicator prices” are calculated by 
the ICO on the basis of the daily spot prices of the relevant types coffee traded in the 
New York and Bremen/Hamburg markets. The ICO prices distinguish between four 
main groups of coffee: Robusta coffee and three types of Arabica coffee (Colombian 




shown in Table 2.2. In the country-by-country analysis the world market price 
corresponds to the coffee type exported. 
2. 6 Estimation results 
 The results of the stationarity tests are reported in Table 2.3. For twelve out of 
seventeen prices the ADF test does not reject the null hypothesis that the price time 
series follow a unit root process at 5% significance. However, when first differences 
of prices are used, the unit root hypothesis is rejected at 1% level for all countries. 
This leads us to conclusion that price differences can be used in the error-correction 
model.  
 The error terms from regressing domestic prices on international prices are 
also tested for unit-root, and the results are presented in Table 2.4. Only for India the 
hypothesis of no cointegration before the reforms is rejected at 5%, which is 
consistent with the prediction that in regulated markets the relationship between 
producer prices and global prices is weak. Given the high degree of government 
intervention in the sector prior to liberalization we can expect the domestic prices to 
be driven by policy decisions, rather than by the world market prices. After the 
reforms cointegration is detected (at 5% significance) in all countries except Brazil, 
Mexico, Uganda and Central African Republic. In the pooled sample with structural 
breaks the null of no cointgration is rejected at 5% significance for all countries 
except Togo and Cameroon. It is interesting to note that in these countries a 
cointegrating relationship was found in the period after the reforms. 
 The estimates of pre- and post-liberalization producer price shares are 




model based on equation (2.5). In nearly all countries the reforms significantly 
increased the share of producer prices in the world market price. For example, in 
Uganda the share in the world market price increased from 31% to 88% and in 
Ethiopia it grew from 35% to 72% In Brazil the share of producer prices for Arabica 
increased from 43% to 81%. Similarly, in India Arabica growers received around 
54% of the world price earlier, and the share has increased to 70%. The only 
exception is Tanzania, where the price share decreased from 56% to 51%. All 
changes are significant at 1% significance level. 
 Short-term transmission has either remained unchanged or improved in all 
cases, most notably in Kenya, Uganda and India, where prior to the reforms price 
transmission was close to zero and increased considerably following the 
liberalization, with the difference significant at 1% level. Post-liberalization 
transmission varies across countries and in some cases, as in Kenya, is very high, 
implying that domestic prices adjust almost immediately to the new equilibrium. 
Asymmetric short-run price transmission did not seem to be a big issue at play, but 
there are a few interesting cases. In Kenya, the transmission of both price increases 
and price decreases changed from zero to positive values after liberalization, but the 
negative price changes are now transmitted faster to growers than the positive 
changes, with the change significant at 1% level. While farm-gate prices only 
increase by 41 cents as world prices go up 1 dollar, price decreases are passed 
through one to one, placing the full burden of falling coffee prices on growers. In 
Madagascar, price transmission improved for price decreases, but price increases are 




conclusion that producer prices fall in the short-run in both cases – when the world 
market price increases and when it decreases. Note, however, that in these two cases 
the R-squared was very low: only 7% and 8% of the producer price variation is 
explained by the model. A similar situation is observed in post-reform Cameroon, 
where no short-term transmission of price decreases was found, but price increases 
lead to immediate downward changes in producer prices. In the extreme case of 
Angola, there was virtually no price transmission prior to liberalization since prices 
were fixed, however in 1991 price plummeted, and the short-term price transmission 
for negative price changes in the post-reform period is 1.59. In Brazil, on the other 
hand, price transmission was significantly higher for price increases than price 
decreases before the reforms, and today there is no difference in transmission.  
 To better understand how the transmission of price decreases changed relative 
to the transmission of price increases, a measure of the net change is constructed and 
presented in Table 2.5. In five out of nine countries, for which the error-correction 
model was estimated, the transmission of price decreases went up by more than the 
transmission of price increases. The countries for which this effect is significant at 
5% are Kenya, Madagascar, Cameroon, Central African Republic and Brazil. This 
simple calculation of the relative changes shows that the impact of the reforms was 
asymmetric in some countries. 
 The speed of adjustment improved significantly, at either 1% or 5% level, in 
eight out of thirteen cases, increasing from close to zero to around 0.2 in Colombia, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It did not improve significantly in Brazil or 




 To understand how the reforms affected the speed at which domestic prices 
react to changes in the world price, it is useful to calculate the degree of adjustment of 
producer prices to a one-time change in the price at the world market. Appendix 2.B 
shows how this parameter is derived. The results for adjustment 6 and 12 months 
after the change in the world price are reported in Table 2.6. In all countries without 
asymmetry in transmission coffee prices adjust faster to changes in the world market 
price after the structural reforms than they did before. In most countries, prior to the 
reforms less than 50% of price adjustment took place in the first six months. In the 
post-reform period, the adjustment rate after six months is over 80%. In Mexico the 
adjustment rate did not change as much as in other countries.  
 In most cases where asymmetric price transmission was detected price 
decreases are transmitted faster today than before liberalization, with the result 
significant at 5% level, however the evidence for price increases is mixed. In Brazil, 
Angola and Kenya most of the price increase is transmitted after six months, and the 
asymmetry between positive and negative price changes is not that strong. However, 
in Madagascar and Central African Republic the differences are sizable, and in 
Cameroon no price increases are passed on to domestic producers at all. 
2. 7 Discussion 
 In eleven out of thirteen countries investigated, grower prices were integrated 
with the world market price in the long run. Following the reforms, short-run 
transmission improved in all countries and eight countries experienced an increase in 
the speed of transmission. In all countries except Tanzania the share of grower price 




 In general, the largest impact of the reforms was detected in countries where 
the liberalization was complete, leading to full withdrawal of state-trading enterprises 
from marketing, significantly simplified procedures for export licensing and entry of 
private traders. The following countries are in this category: Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, 
India, Uganda, Madagascar, Togo and Cameroon. For example, in Uganda the 
liberalization process covered the whole marketing chain from farm purchasing to 
export. Traders are now free to negotiate their own overseas contracts, and payments 
are passed quickly to coffee growers. The result is almost tripling of the producer 
price share and large and significant improvement in the immediate transmission of 
the world market signals. Less striking but equally important results were achieved in 
India and Brazil: Both countries underwent substantial reforms involving a switch 
from state trading to a market-based system. Important results were achieved in 
Kenya and Ethiopia as well, although in these countries the reforms were more 
limited. In Mexico, where the starting point was a less restrictive system, the reforms 
increased the share of grower prices, but did not influence the speed of adjustment 
significantly.   
 In other countries several important reforms took place, but they were less far-
reaching or happened more gradually than in the cases described above. These 
include Colombia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Angola and Central African Republic. In 
Tanzania, cooperative unions, which were controlled by the coffee board prior to the 
reforms, still account for a large share of trade. The Tanzania Coffee Board runs the 
obligatory coffee auction and direct exports are not allowed. The coffee sales taxes 




the last couple of years. All these factors could have an impact on the reform 
outcome. Tanzania is the only country in the sample where the share of grower prices 
in world market prices didn’t increase following the liberalization. In Colombia, 
prices continue to be administered, which could explain some of the remaining 
rigidity in price adjustment and lower share of producer prices. While in Kenya, 
Uganda and Mexico the producer price share is close to 90% in the post-reform 
period, in Colombia and Ethiopia producers capture approximately 70% of the world 
price.  
 In a number of African countries (Madagascar, Togo, Cameroon and the 
Central African Republic) the model fit is rather poor, explaining less than 10% of the 
variation in producer price changes. This is likely to be related to the fact that there 
are other leading determinants of agricultural prices in these countries, not accounted 
for by the model. There are certain disruptive factors at the national level, such as 
wars and political unrest that are likely to have much larger implications for the 
economy and therefore producer prices, than world market prices. Thus, the political 
crisis in Madagascar in 2002 had severely affected economic activity and caused an 
almost complete shutdown of the export processing sector. Because of marketing 
difficulties, farm gate prices dropped (IMF, 2002). In Central African Republic the 
continuous political conflict and unrest since 1990’s have had severe implications for 
the economy. Similarly, economic crisis has been pertinent in Cameroon from the 




2. 8 Conclusions 
 With the help of cointegration analysis and an error-correction model, this 
article examined price transmission from the world coffee market to producers in 
coffee-growing countries before and after structural reforms in the coffee sector. In 
addition, the impact of policy changes on the share of grower prices in world prices 
was estimated. The results show that the share of producer prices in the world price 
has increased substantially in all countries except one. There is closer cointegration 
between the domestic and world markets today than prior to the reforms, and the 
transmission of world price signals has improved in most cases.  
 The case of Tanzania demonstrates that the impact of the liberalization 
process on producer prices seems to be limited if reforms are incomplete. Continued 
regulation of the sector and barriers to entry of new traders curtail competition and 
keep producer prices at a low level relative to the world price.  
  It should be noted that greater price transmission of world market 
prices does not necessarily makes coffee growers better off. In fact, since coffee 
prices plummeted between 2000 and 2003, causing losses and severe financial 
hardships for coffee farmers, producers would most likely have preferred price 
stabilization to a free market system. Moreover, this study shows that in some cases 
the impact of the reforms on price transmission has been asymmetric and therefore 
growers now bear the full costs of price falls, while transmission of the positive price 
signals has not changed much. As the result, farmers are now fully exposed to price 




 However, continued interventions in marketing and price stabilization are 
neither sustainable nor desirable in the long run. First, they place a heavy burden on 
public finances. Bailing out farmers at the time of prolonged crisis requires 
significant resources which most coffee-growing countries lack. Second, government 
policies affecting agricultural markets can also pose significant risks to producers, as 
policy formulation is not always transparent and foreseeable.  
 An alternative to approach could be development of market-based instruments 
for management of coffee price risks. For example, growers could be given 
opportunity to hedge with futures and option contracts or buy a price insurance based 
on these derivatives. This approach is supported by the World Bank (Varangis and 
Larson, 1996; Varangis et.al. 2003; World Bank 2005), which helped set up a number 













































































* Arabica coffee; ** Robusta coffee 




Table 2.1 Structural reforms in the coffee sector 
 
Country Reform year Change in the role of the parastal agency Post-reform policy 
    Price control Domestic 
marketing 
Exporting 
      
Brazil  1990 From price stabilization to industry supervision None Liberalized Liberalized 




Partly done by 
ECPE 
Partly done by 
ECEE 
Kenya  1993 Producer-dominated, reforms limited; mandatory 
auction 
None Liberalized Liberalized 
Tanzania  1994 From state trading to industry supervision; 
mandatory auction 






Colombia  1995 Producer-dominated, reforms limited Administered prices Partly done by the 
FNC 
Partly done by 
the FNC 
Mexico  1993 From state trading to industry supervision None Liberalized Liberalized 
India  1996 From state trading to industry supervision None Liberalized Liberalized 
Uganda  1992 From state trading to industry supervision None Liberalized Liberalized 
Madagascar  1988 From state trading to industry supervision None Liberalized Liberalized 
Togo  1996 From state trading to industry supervision None Liberalized Liberalized 
Angola  1991 From state trading to industry supervision Minimum prices Liberalized Liberalized 
Cameroon  1994 From state trading to industry supervision None Liberalized Liberalized 
Central African Republic  1991 From state trading to industry supervision Indicative prices Liberalized Liberalized 




 Table 2.2 Coffee exports by country, shares (quantity) 
August 2006 to September 2007 
          
Colombian Milds 12.6%  Robustas 34.6% 
   Colombia 11.6%     Vietnam 18.5% 
   Kenya 0.5%     Indonesia 4.2% 
   Tanzania 0.5%     Côte D'Ivoire 2.7% 
   Other 0.003%     Brazil 1.6% 
      Uganda 1.3% 
Other Milds 21.7%     India 2.0% 
   Guatemala 3.8%     Cameroon 0.6% 
   Peru 3.7%     Togo 0.2% 
   Honduras 3.3%     Madagascar 0.1% 
   Mexico 3.0%     Central African Republic 0.1% 
   India 2.0%     Other 3.3% 
   Other 5.8%    
     
Brazilian Naturals 31.1%    
   Brazil 24.8%    
   Ethiopia 3.1%    
   Indonesia 1.0%    
   Other 2.2%    
     
TOTAL    100% 
          
 




Table 2.3 Stationarity of the producer and the world prices 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (without trend)
1 
            
Annual prices 1976-2005 ADF statistic 
  Price level First differences 
            
      
ICO indicator prices     
      
 Brazilian naturals -2.49  -6.71 *** 
 Colombian milds -2.54  -8.21 *** 
 Other mild arabica -2.89 ** -7.56 *** 
 Robustas -2.16  -8.00 *** 
      
Producer prices     
      
 Brazil arabica -3.09 ** -8.41 *** 
 Ethiopia arabica -3.04 ** -8.46 *** 
 Kenya arabica -2.50  -9.26 *** 
 Tanzania arabica -2.68 * -7.43 *** 
 Colombia arabica -2.67 * -6.96 *** 
 India arabica -3.11 ** -7.27 *** 
 Mexico arabica -2.61 * -7.14 *** 
 Uganda robusta -2.75 * -8.66 *** 
 Madagascar robusta -1.96  -8.22 *** 
 Togo robusta -2.52  -6.45 *** 
 Angola robusta -4.57 *** -10.38 *** 
 Cameroon robusta -1.89  -7.53 *** 
 Central African Republic robusta -2.09  -6.86 *** 
            




Table 2.4 Cointegration between domestic and world prices 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (without trend)
1
 
                  
Annual prices 1976-2005 









                  
         
Brazil Arabica 1990  -2.53  -2.43  -3.99 *** 
Ethiopia Arabica 1992  -2.32  -3.94 *** -4.41 *** 
Kenya Arabica 1993  -2.60 * -4.62 *** -5.26 *** 
Tanzania Arabica 1994  -2.80 * -2.95 ** -3.78 *** 
Colombia Arabica 1995  -2.40  -3.71 *** -3.27 ** 
India Arabica 1996  -3.05 ** -3.13 ** -3.79 *** 
Mexico Arabica 1993  -2.60 * -2.43  -3.35 ** 
Uganda Robusta 1992  -2.76 * -2.11  -3.61 *** 
Madagascar Robusta 1988  -2.46 * -3.57 *** -4.59 *** 
Togo Robusta 1996  -1.74  -4.84 *** -2.72 * 
Angola Robusta 1991  -0.97  -5.57 *** -4.92 *** 
Cameroon Robusta 1995  -2.34  -3.39 ** -2.77 * 
Central African Republic Robusta 1991  -1.77  -2.87 * -2.97 ** 
                  




Table 2.5 Error-correction model with asymmetric price transmission 
Estimation results for (2.5) 
 














Reform year 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1993 1996
Before reforms (δ1) 0.31 *** 0.10 * 0.18 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.06
After reforms (δ3) 0.79 *** 0.45 *** 1.05 *** 0.08 0.31 *** 0.32 ** 0.49 ***
Change significant Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** No Yes *** No Yes ***
Before reforms (δ2) 0.54 *** 0.13 *** 0.08 0.02 0.06 ** 0.21 ** 0.05
After reforms (δ4) 0.77 *** 0.44 *** 0.41 *** 0.17 *** 0.32 *** 0.59 *** 0.46 ***
Change significant Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Before reforms Yes+ *** No No No No No No
After reforms No No Yes
-
*** No No No No
0.25 ** 0.04 0.54 ** -0.13 0.04 -0.17 0.02
Before reforms (θ1) 0.11 *** 0.01 0.08 * 0.03 0.05 *** 0.17 *** 0.07 ***
After reforms (θ1) 0.14 *** 0.17 *** 0.22 *** 0.20 *** 0.27 *** 0.14 *** 0.18 ***
Change significant No Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** No No
Before reforms (γ1) 0.43 *** 0.35 *** 0.78 *** 0.56 *** 0.48 *** 0.54 *** 0.54 ***
After reforms (γ1) 0.81 *** 0.72 *** 0.92 *** 0.51 *** 0.70 *** 0.90 *** 0.70 ***
Change significant Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Observations 355 355 346 354 359 344 359
0.52 0.19 0.25 0.11 0.37 0.19 0.24
price decreases
price increases
Asymmetric price transmission 
significant
Speed of adjustment




Net change in the short-term transmission
1)
 
*  significant at 10% 
**  significant at 5% 
***  significant at 1% 
Yes+ (Yes-) means that short-run transmission is significantly higher (lower) for price increases than for price decreases 




Table 2.5 (continued)  Error-correction model with asymmetric price transmission 
 




Type of coffee Robusta Robusta Robusta Robusta Robusta Robusta
Reform year 1992 1988 1996 1991 1995 1991
Before reforms (δ1) 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03
After reforms (δ3) 0.77 *** 0.14 ** 0.29 *** 1.59 * 0.03 0.16 ***
Change significant Yes *** Yes * Yes *** Yes * No Yes ***
Before reforms (δ2) -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
After reforms (δ4) 0.73 *** -0.12 ** 0.19 * -0.34 -0.28 ** 0.03
Change significant Yes *** Yes * No Yes Yes ** No
Before reforms No No No No No No









0.00 0.25 ** 0.16 1.95 * 0.36 ** 0.17 **
Before reforms (θ1) 0.08 *** 0.04 0.03 ** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.02 *
After reforms (θ1) 0.19 *** 0.09 *** 0.16 *** 0.57 *** 0.07 * 0.10 ***
Change significant Yes ** No Yes *** Yes *** No Yes ***
Before reforms (γ1) 0.31 *** 0.23 *** 0.28 *** 0.46 *** 0.35 *** 0.28 ***
After reforms (γ1) 0.88 *** 0.48 *** 0.63 *** 0.72 *** 0.49 *** 0.44 ***
Change significant Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Observations 359 350 355 352 326 337





Net change in the short-term transmission
1)
Target share of world price
R-squared




*  significant at 10% 
**  significant at 5% 
***  significant at 1% 
Yes+ (Yes-) means that short-run transmission is significantly higher (lower) for price increases than for price decreases 




Table 2.6 Adjustment to a one-time change in the world price 
Countries with no price transmission asymmetry 
Country Type of coffee Before reforms After reforms 
    6 months 12 months 6 months 12 months 
      
Ethiopia Brazilian natural 36% 39% 88% 96% 
Tanzania Colombian mild 22% 35% 80% 95% 
Colombia Colombian mild 35% 53% 92% 99% 
India Other milds 43% 63% 89% 97% 
Mexico Other milds 77% 93% 84% 94% 
Uganda Robusta 40% 64% 96% 99% 
Togo Robusta 13% 28% 78% 92% 
            
 
Countries with price transmission asymmetry 
Country Type of coffee Before reforms After reforms 








      
Brazil Brazilian natural 86% 112% 99% 98% 
Kenya Colombian mild 54% 46% 103% 88% 
Madagascar Robusta 24% 21% 60% 29% 
Angola Robusta 1% 5% 101% 99% 
Cameroon Robusta 15% 26% 40% -1% 
Central African Republic Robusta 3% 15% 67% 51% 






Appendix 2.A: Coffee market reforms by country 
 
Brazil 
 Prior to the liberalization in 1990 the Brazilian coffee sector was run by the 
parastatal Instituto Brasileiro do Café (IBC), which was responsible for a vast range 
of activities: setting minimum export prices, regulating standards, supervising 
domestic sales and exports, purchasing surplus coffee and administering stocks. Most 
notably, the government was involved in price stabilization, buying any surplus green 
coffee from millers at a guaranteed minimum price. In 1990 the sector was almost 
entirely liberalized, abolishing minimum prices and placing marketing in the hands of 
private traders.  
 The post-reform state involvement in the sector is limited to management and 
sale of publicly owned stocks, providing credit for growing, harvesting and 
processing and funding coffee research. Both domestic purchasing and exporting are 
run by the private sector. Prices are fully determined by the market. Although private 
exporters were allowed prior to liberalization, entry into the sector increased 
drastically after the reforms. Over 220 companies are listed as exporters, with none 
exporting more than 10% of the total. However, there is some indication of increasing 
collusion among exporters (CRMG). 
Colombia 
 Colombia is an outstanding example of a coffee sector entirely run by an 
association of producers. The powerful Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de 
Colombia (FNC) exerts major influence on the functioning of the sector. The FNC is 




coffee marketing is substantial: the FNC sets minimum producer prices, controls 
purchasing, processing and exporting of coffee and provides extension services, 
support to research and funding of infrastructure projects. FNC’s agents handle half 
of all coffee sales, with the remaining crop being sold to private traders. In 1996 
private exporters accounted for approximately 60% of all exports, while 40% were 
handled by the FNC. In addition, the FNC acts as a stabilization fund, buying surplus 
coffee from producers at a guaranteed price, which may exceed the world price net of 
marketing costs. In particular, between 1989 and 1994 producer received artificially 
high administered prices, causing losses to the FNC. Unsustainable in the long run, 
the system was abolished in 1995. Although no radical structural changes were made 
that year, 1995 is taken as the year of the reforms, because the high producer prices 
were suspended, which brought the internal prices closer to the world market prices. 
While the Colombian coffee sector is marked by high degree of regulation, the 
system seems to benefit the growers. Acting unified, Colombian growers manage to 
get a substantial price premium on the world market and can influence the domestic 
policy to their benefit. Unlike in many other coffee producing countries, the system 
serves the interests of producers, not government bureaucrats or influential exporters. 
Ethiopia 
 Until 1992 the Ethiopian Coffee Marketing Corporation (ECMC) fully 
controlled coffee marketing, handling 86% of all crop purchases in 1990/91. Growers 
were committed to deliver annual quotas at a fixed price. After the switch in the 
country’s economic policy towards a market-based economy, ECMC was divided 




purchases coffee, and the Ethiopian Coffee Export Enterprise (ECEE), which handles 
exports. Both compete with the private sector. The reforms facilitated entry of new 
traders and exporters. Around 75 exporters are now active and 240 hold an export 
license. Private traders account for 75% of exports, compared to only 10% prior to 
1992. However, the sector remains somewhat regulated, with Coffee Price 
Differential Setting Committee setting daily minimum export differentials. 
Kenya 
Similar to the Colombian case, the parastatal coffee regulatory and monitoring 
authority in Kenya (the Coffee Board of Kenya, CBK) is an organization dominated 
by producers and serves their interests. CBK’s board consists of nine growers and 
four government officials. Throughout the years CBK managed to get the highest 
price margins for exported coffee and Kenya is considered to be one of the highest 
quality producers of arabica in the world. To this date CBK remains in control of 
licensing producers and traders and is involved in marketing and research. Direct 
involvement in marketing is very limited, however. Coffee produced by smallholders 
is marketed by co-operatives, while the larger estates have their own marketing 
channels. All coffee in Kenya is sold to licensed traders and exporters at weekly 
auctions at the Nairobi Coffee Exchange.  
Liberalization of the Kenyan coffee sector followed a piecemeal approach. 
Prior to liberalization, growers received payments for their coffee in installments as 
coffee passed through the various stages of processing and marketing. The final price 
paid to producers was based on the average auction price for the season. In 1993 the 




actual price of the coffee auctioned less marketing costs. Another outcome of the 
liberalization process was greater competition in coffee processing. Prior to 1994-
1995 the Kenya Planter’s Co-operative Union (KPCU) carried out all milling of 
coffee. The monopoly ended when two other mills were established. Finally, in 1997 
the monopoly of the Kenya Coffee Auctions (partly owned by CBK) to act as broker 
in coffee auctions ended, and the growers were able to choose a private broker, if they 
wished. Because the pricing mechanism can be expected to have a direct impact on 
the prices received by growers, 1993 is set as the year of the most important reforms. 
Tanzania 
 In Tanzania the liberalization took place in 1994, when private traders were 
allowed to purchase, process and export coffee. Prior to 1994 marketing was handled 
by the Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board (TCMB) and the government-controlled 
cooperative unions. TCMB controlled internal prices and exports. Farmers delivered 
coffee to primary societies at a previously announced price. The cooperative unions 
then performed milling and grading and brought coffee to TCMB to be sold to private 
exporters through auctions. The proceeds were then passed back to growers through 
cooperative unions and primary societies, deducting marketing and processing costs 
at each stage. It took at least a year for growers to receive the second portion of the 
payment (Baffes, 2003). Following the liberalization, the market share of private 
traders in the internal market changed from zero to 67%, with vertically integrated 
exporters accounting for almost half of the coffee trade. The share handled by 
cooperative unions and other government organizations fell accordingly from 94% to 




the marketing sector upon their implementation, in the last couple of years the trend 
has reversed. In 2000/2001 the Coffee Board revoked buying licenses of the private 
traders to ensure that the government-guaranteed loans to the cooperative unions get 
repaid. The ban was extended for the 2001/2002 season. The mandatory coffee 
auction is still in place. The existing tax system is too complex. The taxes are high 
and have been increasing in the last couple of years, eroding the revenues generated 
within the sector.  
India 
 In the beginning of 1990’s India switched its course from a centrally planned 
economy towards a free market system. Prior to the liberalization of the coffee 
market, the Coffee Board (CB) was in full control of coffee purchasing, processing 
and exporting. The CB ran two auctions: one for the domestic market and one for the 
export market. Similar to the pre-reform systems in many other countries, growers 
were paid in two stages: an advance at the delivery point and after the coffee has been 
auctioned. Given the inefficiencies of the marketing system, this meant that in some 
cases growers had to wait up to two years after the delivery to receive their payment 
in full. The reforms were introduced gradually, starting in 1992-1993 when producers 
were allowed to market 30% of their own crop on the domestic market, with the 
remaining coffee sold at the CB’s auctions.  
 By 1996 the CB’s involvement in marketing ended completely, and coffee 
growers and exporters were free to trade the crop as they chose. Pooling of coffee into 
compulsory auctions had also ended. These changes meant that the producers 




to domestic agents and exporters. The number of registered exporters increased from 
approximately 50 to almost 100 since early 1990’s. The role of the CB today is 
limited to quality control, industry regulation, research and other non-interventionist 
functions. 
Mexico 
 The liberalization of the Mexican coffee sector took place in 1993, when the 
Mexican Coffee Institute (INMECAFE), previously in charge of managing the ICO 
quotas, was replaced by the Mexican Coffee Council. The scope of the government 
intervention in the sector was reduced to promotion of Mexican coffee domestically 
and internationally and providing technical assistance to growers. Coffee is bought 
from farmers by producer organization and private traders, processed and sold to 
domestic roasters and exporters. In 1997 there were 230 exporters, 15 of which 
accounted for 68% of the total volume exported (CRMG, 2002a).   
Uganda 
 Until 1992 the exports of coffee from Uganda were fully controlled by the 
government, which acted through the Coffee Marketing Board (CMB) and the official 
cooperative societies. The farmgate prices were fixed. Liberalization of the coffee 
sector occurred in several stages. First, CMB lost the monopoly power over exports, 
and private traders and cooperatives were allowed to export directly. In 1991 a new 
agency, the Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA), was formed with the 
mandate "to promote and oversee the coffee industry by developing research, 




therewith"2. The same year the administered prices were replaced by indicative 
prices. In 1992 the export tax on coffee was removed, but was reintroduced in 1994 
as a stabilization tax. Since the liberalization the share of CMB in coffee exports 
declined steadily, and full withdrawal took place in 1997/1998. Within months after 
the reforms 18 companies were registered as legal exporters and by 1994/95 the 
number reached 117. However, in the following years the number of registered 
exporters declined sharply: In the 2000/01 season there were only 22. At the same 
time, the share of top ten firms grew from 71% in 1994/95 to 87% in 2000/01 
(CRMG, 2002b). 
Madagascar 
Madagascar liberalized the coffee sector earlier than other countries. Prior to 
the reforms the marketing and stabilization board Caisse de Commercialisation et de 
Stabilisation des Prix du Café, de la Vanille et du Girofle (CAVAGI) was in charge of 
negotiating export contracts and managed five state owned exporting firms. Grower 
prices and marketing margins were fixed at the beginning of each crop year. In 1988 
the sector was liberalized. The level of taxation was reduced and a large number of 
buyers entered the market. The number of exporters rose from five to 35. Since 1996 
the concentration increased, the exports now being dominated by a few firms 
(between five and ten), all with strong links to multinational trade companies (ICO).  
Togo 
 As in a typical pre-reform marketing system, the parastatal agency in Togo, 
OPAT (Office des Produits Agricoles Togolais), fixed grower prices and traders’ 
marketing margins and acted as a monopoly exporter. Internal marketing, on the other 
                                                 




hand, was handled by the private sector. Following the liberalization in 1996, the role 
of the government in commodity marketing became confined to provision of inputs 
and supporting establishment of farmers’ organizations. The monopoly over 
exporting activities ended, and new traders and exporters emerged on the market. 
However, entry into exporting remained limited. Four companies dominate the 
market, accounting for approximately 75% of exports (CRMG). Internal marketing is 
carried out by private agents and co-operatives. 
Angola 
 Prior to 1991 Angola’s coffee sector was run by two state marketing boards: 
Cafangol, which operated throughout the country, and Uigimex, which was 
responsible for coffee marketing and exporting only from Uige province. Partial 
liberalization began in 1991/1992, when private agents were allowed to compete 
Cafangol and Uigimex by buying coffee from farmers. The ICO reports that including 
the two parastatal agencies there are 25 licensed exporters, but five of them handled 
over 90% of the total exports in 1998. There is still substantial governmental 
involvement in the sector. The State Secretariat for Coffee (Secafé) regulates and 
oversees the coffee industry, operating through the National Coffee Institute (INCA). 
The prices are regulated, with INCA setting the minimum producer prices at the 
beginning of the coffee season in May. The prices can be changed during the year. 
Clearly, the actual price paid to growers could exceed the minimum price, but it 
appears that only in very few areas of the country grower prices are higher than the 





 Two marketing channels were operational in Cameroon prior to the reforms. 
In the anglophone areas, ONCPB, (Office National de Comercialisation des Produits 
de Base) acted as a marketing board, buying the crop from licensed agents and 
exporting it. In the francophone zones, private agents were allowed to export under 
the negotiated export contracts, but ONCBP fixed regional farm prices and marketing 
margins. The liberalization of the coffee sector was gradual, ending in complete 
elimination of government involvement in the sector. In 1991 state licensing of 
domestic traders was abolished, and private exporters were allowed to export directly. 
While arabica marketing was fully liberalized, the state continued to fix marketing 
margins for robusta coffee, and a stabilization fund was established to control farm 
prices. The stabilization mechanism was dismantled in 1994/95. Immediately 
following the reforms, the number of exporters increased drastically from around 60 
to over 300, but later declined to around 50, with ten firms exporting over 70% of the 
total (ICO). No government approval is needed to become an exporter, a simple 
statement of existence is sufficient (CRMG, 2002c). 
Central African Republic 
 The stabilization fund of the Central African Republic was dissolved in 1991 
and a new agency, the Office for the Regulation of Marketing and Quality Control of 
Agricultural Products (ORCCPA), was formed to oversee coffee marketing. Today 
the government announces indicator prices at the beginning of the harvest season, and 
producer prices are negotiated on the basis of those prices. Grower prices are 









Appendix 2.B: Derivation of the degree of adjustment 
Initially, when the world price is pw, the equilibrium domestic price equals 
γp
w. When the world price changes by ∆pw, the new long-term equilibrium level of 
the domestic price is )( ww pp ∆+γ . Thus, a full adjustment would require the 
domestic price to change by γ∆pw. At t = 0, when the change in the world price 
occurs, the internal price changes by δ∆pw. The degree of adjustment is then δ/γ. Note 
that if δ = γ the degree of adjustment is one, meaning that full adjustment occurs 
immediately following the change in the world price. Otherwise, an error-correction 
component is added to the domestic price in the following period.  
Note that the cumulative change in the domestic price n periods after the jump 
in the world prices equals the sum of all previous changes in the domestic price plus 
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Note that γθθδ −+ )1(  can be rewritten as )1)(( θδγγ +−− . Then, in 
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In the next period, at t = 3, the total change in the domestic price is  
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θδγγ       (2.B.6) 
The degree of adjustment is the total change in the domestic price relative to 
full adjustment, which is γ∆pw. Thus, n period after the change in the world price the 
































Chapter 3: Producer prices and trader competition: the case of 
coffee in India 
3.1 Introduction 
 In development economics lack of competition in the marketing sector of 
commodity producing countries is often mentioned as a constraint to effective market 
functioning. It is often argued that structural impediments, such as the high cost of 
obtaining information regarding market conditions, poor infrastructure and limited 
access to credit, curtail competition among market intermediaries and thereby inflate 
marketing margins and suppress the earnings of farmers. In the case of coffee, 
growers receive a notoriously small share of the export price of green coffee beans. 
This has significant implications for the welfare of the growers, most of which are 
smallholders with low incomes.  
 Two of the most common concerns raised by coffee producers are limited 
access to information about local and international prices and the high degree of 
market power of intermediaries. It is a widespread belief that traders and exporters 
take advantage of the growers not only by exercising oligopsony power, but also by 
constraining the flow of market information, resulting in lower than competitive 
prices to producers. For example, a World Bank report states: “On a CRMG3 mission 
to India an often-heard complaint of the smallest growers who attended information 
sessions on the risk management plan was that they had only one available buyer and 
that they were not always clear that the prices they were receiving were in line with 
                                                 




prices paid elsewhere, and that information from the agents about the market were 
correct.” (CRMG, 2003). 
 This chapter investigates the roles of competition among market 
intermediaries in determining the spread between export prices of coffee and prices 
received by growers, utilizing a survey of coffee producers in the state of Karnataka 
in India. A model with oligopsonic competition in the marketing sector is developed 
and the impact of competition on producer prices is tested empirically. 
3.2 Marketing margins and market power:  the evidence 
 Agricultural economists have long been concerned with the presence of 
imperfect competition in food markets. For the past 30 years, the empirical work in 
this area has been dominated by “New Empirical Industrial Organization” paradigm. 
Bresnahan (1989) provides an extensive review of the econometric studies of market 
power that follow the NEIO approach. An updated review of empirical research in 
this area is provided by Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani (2002). These studies seek to 
detect and quantify market power in single markets or groups of related markets. 
NEIO is a structural approach which relies on economic theory for specification of 
the empirical model and interpretation of the results. Typically, the studies develop a 
stylized econometric model of oligopoly or oligopsony interaction, based on 
economic theory, and estimate a system of simultaneous equations to either test for 
presence of monopolistic competition or to capture the market power parameter itself. 
The only endogenous variables are usually output prices and quantities, while input 
prices are taken as given. Some studies estimate the structural equations of the model 




To arrive at the reduced form, these studies typically make simplifying assumptions 
on the functional form of the equations, such as constant elasticities or linear 
functions describing the demand for final good and input supply. In general, this type 
of study uses time series pertaining to a specific industry.  
 The methodology has found broad application in particular in empirical 
analysis of marketing margins in agricultural commodity markets, as documented in 
Wohlgenant (2001). In terms of theoretical underpinnings, papers of this type often 
build upon the farm-retail model developed by Gardner (1975) to detect market 
power. The theoretical model consists of three interdependent markets: food retail 
market and markets for farm product and marketing services. All markets are 
characterized by perfect competition. Gardner shows in the context of his model how 
shifts in exogenous variables (shocks to supply and demand functions) affect the 
equilibrium levels of the endogenous variables and the farm-retail price spread.  
Gardner’s paper builds a basic framework for analysis of the interdependent markets 
that constitute the farm-food retail chain and which can be useful for estimating 
marketing margins and price transmission in agricultural markets, but it does not 
allow for imperfect competition.  
 Several generalizations and extensions of this model exist. Conceptual and 
empirical framework is expanded by  introducing additional refinement to Gardner’s 
model and exploring the roles of trade policy (Chambers, 1983), output price 
uncertainty (Schroeter and Azzam, 1991) and the nature of causality of farm- and 
retail- price shocks (Holloway and Hertel, 1996). Holloway (1991) relaxes the 




oligopoly in the retail food industry. The paper develops an empirical methodology 
for detecting imperfect competition in food marketing and applies it to eight products 
on the US market. The approach is similar to the one originally developed by 
Appelbaum (1982) to estimate the degree of oligopoly power.   
 The empirical NEIO literature has produced a wealth of evidence that many 
agricultural sectors are characterized by substantial market power in marketing and 
distribution. Schroeter (1988) used fixed proportions between the farm and marketing 
inputs to develop a model that allowed for both oligopoly and oligopsony power in 
the beef packing industry. Small, but significant, market power in both the output and 
input markets was detected. The evidence of imperfect competition in the meat-
packing industry is even more compelling in Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990), who 
extended Schroeter’s model to allow for variable input proportions. An interesting 
result in this paper is also that the monopsony distortion was much larger than the 
monopoly distortion. More recently, Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) relax the common 
assumption of constant returns to scale and estimate the degree of oligopoly power 
for forty US food and tobacco industries, finding that most industries exhibit 
significant oligopoly power.  
 Numerous studies highlight the persistence of oligopsony distortions in 
agricultural processing and marketing sectors. For example, Just and Chern, (1980) 
find evidence of price-leadership oligopsony in the tomato market, Schroeter and 
Azzam (1991) detect oligopsony in the pork-packing industry and Schroeter (1987) 




 Most empirical studies used to detect market power in food and agricultural 
marketing focus on the US market, because the data are readily available. Empirical 
evidence of noncompetitive behavior in other countries, on the other hand, is limited. 
One of the few empirical studies that utilize European data (Gohin and Guyomard, 
2000) conclude that the French food retailing sector is characterized by imperfect 
competition. The data are particularly scarce for developing countries and therefore 
there are practically no studies on developing economies, although casual reporting 
on market power in the marketing sector is abundant. One notable exception to this is 
Lopez and You (1993a), who estimate the degree of oligopsony power in the Haitian 
coffee sector.  
 While the NEIO literature typically focuses on testing for noncompetitive firm 
behavior using measurable market outcomes such as prices and quantities, there are 
practically no published studies that do the reverse: estimate the effect of market 
power on market outcomes. Clearly, this shortcoming is due to the fact that market 
power can not be observed and measured. The few papers that attempt to establish 
this relationship rely on simulations using either estimated or assumed elasticities of 
demand and supply. Thus, McCorriston et al.(1998) follow the approach taken by 
Gardner (1975) and Holloway (1991) to develop a model that explores the role of 
market power in determining the elasticity of price transmission from farm to retail. 
The paper focuses explicitly on the transmission of exogenous price shocks from farm 
to retail and shows how this transmission depends on the extent of oligopoly power. 
The authors simulate the effect of changes in the market power parameter on the farm 




transmission elasticity is lower in noncompetitive cases. Again, simulations using 
developing economies data are extremely scarce. One example of such study is a 
paper by Lopez and You (1993b), who use estimated supply and demand elasticities 
in the Haitian coffee sector to calculate the impact of market power on coffee prices.  
 A related branch of the literature in the area of development economics 
documents more loosely the presence of imperfect competition in the marketing 
sector in commodity markets, often focusing on the number of traders in a particular 
sector, and discusses the potential implications for the welfare of farmers. Special 
attention in this literature is given to commodity market reforms in developing 
countries, which had entry of traders and increased competition in the marketing 
sector as one of the objectives, and their consequences for marketing margins and 
farm-gate prices (Akiyama et.al, 2001). The evidence of the reforms being successful 
in enhancing competition among commodity traders has been mixed. Typically, the 
studies do find that market reforms produced an inflow of private traders and reduced 
the marketing margins, for example in the study of the Tanzanian coffee system by 
Winter-Nelson and Temu (2002). However, consistency and effectiveness of the 
reforms have been questioned. Using the data from a survey of traders in Madagascar, 
Barrett (1997) concludes that that post-liberalization entry is constrained by a number 
of factors such as sunk costs, access to capital and relationship to the state food 
marketing channel.  
 Concerns have also been raised about the fact that while liberalization initially 
produced an inflow of private traders into marketing to replace the inefficient state 




collusion among traders became common. Today, marketing and exporting activities 
in many commodity producing countries are dominated by few domestic or 
multinational firms as barriers to entry persist. Thus, in Tanzania, in 2000/2001 the 
Coffee Board revoked the buying licenses of private traders, effectively handing 
monopsony power to the cooperative unions (Baffes, 2005).  
 This paper contributes to the existing literature with empirical analysis of 
farm-gate coffee producer prices in India. The goal of the study is to estimate the 
impact of competition in the marketing sector, as perceived by growers, and other 
market variables on producer prices. As explained above, the empirical NEIO 
literature typically seeks to detect and quantify market power and rarely evaluates the 
effect of this market power on producer prices. On the other hand, development 
economics literature provides some interesting observations and basic analysis of the 
competition issues in commodity markets, but does not provide convincing empirical 
evidence of the relationship between oligopsony power of traders and prices received 
by growers. This paper intends to fill these two gaps. 
3.3 Coffee production and marketing in India 
3.3.1 Production and processing 
India’s contribution to world’s coffee production and export is modest, yet it is 
increasing steadily. Coffee exports more than doubled from 1990 to 2005 and at the 
same time India’s share in global trade increased from 2% to 4%. Production fell 
substantially in the years following the coffee price crisis in 2000-2003, but recovered 
remarkably in 2005 and grew by 20%, despite continued slump in global production. 




about 70% of it was exported. Approximately two thirds of Indian exports are of 
Robusta variety and one third is Arabica coffee4. The most important export markets 
are Italy, Germany, Belgium and Russia, which together account for over half of the 
volume of Indian exports of coffee. Coffee growing is concentrated in 3 southern 
states: Karnataka, Kerala and Tamilnadu. It is estimated that nearly 5 million people 
in total depend on income from coffee production either through ownership of 
plantations, farm labor (578 thousands in 2005/06) or employment in processing, 
roasting, soluble manufacture and export sectors (CRMG 2003). According to the 
Coffee Board of India, in 2003/04 72% of all coffee growers were smallholders with 
planted area less than 10 hectares. These farms produce approximately 60% of all 
Indian coffee.  
 Producers choose to grow either Arabica or Robusta coffee or both and they 
perform basic processing on the farm before selling the coffee. The production cycles 
for both Robusta and Arabica start in April. Harvesting of Arabica starts in 
December, and Robusta is harvested in January and February. Most farmers do not 
carry over stocks and therefore most coffee is traded locally and exported in the 
months following the harvest, with largest volumes traded between March and May.  
 The two processes used in India to transform raw coffee into the green bean 
are the dry method and the wet method (washing). The berries of the coffee plant, 
both Arabica and Robusta, are harvested and subjected to on-farm processing to 
extract the bean in its raw form. The dry method is the simplest and least costly 
method as it requires little machinery. Drying is typically done by spreading the ripe 
                                                 





cherries in the sun. Most Robusta coffee undergoes this type of processing. The wet 
method requires the use of specific equipment and substantial quantities of water and 
is therefore more costly. The principal difference between dry and wet processing is 
that when wet method is applied, the flesh of the berry (pulp) is removed from the 
coffee bean before the drying stage. Consequently, the degree of on-farm processing 
is far higher under the wet method and that is reflected in the farm-gate price. 
Moreover, the wet method allows the intrinsic qualities of the coffee beans to be 
better preserved, producing a green coffee which is homogeneous and has few 
defective beans. Hence, the coffee produced by this method is usually regarded as 
being of better quality and commands a higher export price. The dry-processed 
(unwashed) coffee, on the other hand, is likely to have inferior aroma and flavor and 
therefore receives a lower price. India Coffee Board price data shows that unwashed 
coffee sold at farm-gate receives on average only 45-50% of the washed coffee price. 
 The last stage of coffee processing for both types is “curing”, which usually 
takes place at a curing plant shortly before the coffee is sold for export. Typically the 
process involves mechanical removal of stones, dirt and sticks, hulling (removal of 
the husk cover in the case of unwashed coffee and parchment cover in the case of 
washed coffee), screening, grading, sorting by color which allows elimination of 
defective beans and bagging into 50 kg bags.    
3.3.2 Marketing 
 The marketing chain for coffee in India consists of four major players: 
growers, intermediaries (agents and traders), curing plants and exporters. Typically, 




plantation owners at the farm-gate, that is, traders come to estates to purchase coffee. 
All trade is made on the spot, with immediate payment and delivery. The use of 
production contracts and options is very limited. Small growers typically deliver dry-
processed cherry, while larger estates that own the necessary equipment deliver 
washed coffee. Most local traders are linked to exporters, which are all Indian-owned 
companies, with little or no foreign participation. There are approximately 40 major 
buying centers and in general the level of competition among local traders is 
perceived as high. However, smaller growers, and in particular in remote areas, often 
deal with only one buyer, and a common claim is that farmers are not well informed 
about the local coffee prices making it easy for the trader to take advantage of them. 
They often receive the information regarding current market conditions directly from 
traders and are not convinced that the information is correct. 
 After the curing process has been completed, curers or agents sell the coffee to 
exporters or to domestic wholesalers, either directly or through the weekly Indian 
Coffee Traders Association (ICTA) auction in Bangalore. Agents, traders and curers 
bring a sample of cured coffee (green beans) to the auction where coffee is sold 
though oral, ascending bid English auction to exporters and local buyers. Based on 
the type of processing (dry or wet), four types of raw coffee beans are traded in the 
Indian market: Washed Arabica (commercially known as Plantation); Unwashed 
Arabica (commercially known as Arabica Cherry); Washed Robusta (commercially 
known as Robusta Parchment) and Unwashed Robusta (commercially known as 




the coffee, the final product (green bean) that underwent wet-processed received 
higher price than coffee that was processed by the dry method.  
 There are two main producer organizations in Karnataka. Larger farms belong 
to the United Planters Association of South India, whereas smaller estates are often 
members of Karnataka Growers Federation. There are very few grower cooperatives, 
the most important one is Comark, which provides credit to members and also 
operates small-scale insurance schemes.  According to the India Coffee Board , the 
quality is fairly homogeneous across estates and green coffee is not graded by farms 
prior to the sale. Local prices vary during the harvest year: prices are typically lowest 
during harvest time when most growers sell their coffee and rise as the supply 
shrinks. 
3.3.3 Policy 
Prior to the liberalization of the coffee market, the Coffee Board (CB) was in full 
control of coffee purchasing, processing and exporting. The CB ran two auctions: one 
for the domestic market and one for the export market. Growers were paid in two 
stages: an advance at the delivery point and after the coffee has been auctioned. 
Given the inefficiencies of the marketing system, this meant that in some cases 
growers had to wait up to two years after the delivery to receive their payment in full.  
 The reforms were introduced gradually, starting in 1992-1993 when producers 
were allowed to market 30% of their own crop on the domestic market, with the 
remaining coffee sold at the CB’s auctions. By 1996 the CB’s involvement in 
marketing ended completely, and coffee growers and exporters were free to trade the 




Auctions are still held every two weeks but the volumes traded there are quite small. 
These changes meant that the producers received payment much faster, within days 
after sale. Coffee can be sold at farm-gate to domestic agents and exporters. The 
number of registered exporters increased from approximately 50 to almost 100 since 
early 1990’s.  
 The role of the CB today is limited to quality improvement programs, 
research, providing market information, export promotion and other non-
interventionist functions. CB has 33 members: 11 central and regional government 
representatives and 22 are private industry (11 of which are growers – 3 large-scale 
and 8 small-scale producer groups). 
 Liberalization had two important implications for the growers. On the one 
hand, a more efficient market characterized by a greater degree of competition among 
traders led to contraction of the marketing margins and a greater share of producer 
prices in the world market price, as established in Chapter 2. On the other hand, 
liberalization left farmers exposed to fluctuations in the global prices, as protection in 
the form of pooled prices and variable export tax rates was removed. During the 
coffee price crisis that began in 2001 the drastic reduction in world market prices was 
passed on fully to farmers and their incomes plummeted, turning into losses in many 
cases. Combined, these two effects meant that the impact of liberalization on 






 To estimate the impact of competition among traders on prices received by 
growers, a basic food industry model with two inputs (farm commodity and 
marketing service) and one output is developed, along the lines of Gardner (1975). 
The model allows for noncompetitive firm behavior, following in the conceptual 
footsteps of Appelbaum (1982) and Holloway (1991). Rather than considering 
oligopoly, as in these two papers, this chapter analyzes the case of oligopsony power 
in the marketing sector. A departure from the typical farm-retail price ratio models 
(McCorriston et.al 1998 and 2001) is that the price of output (green coffee for export) 
is the exogenous world market price pw. Given that India supplies only 4% of all 
coffee traded internationally, India is assumed to be a price taker in the world coffee 
market. Traders buy coffee from growers at the farm-gate, bring it to curers and then 
sell the processed coffee to exporters. Traders have identical production functions 
and, given their limited number, exhort oligopsony power over producers in each area 
where they operate. 
 For simplicity, assume a generalized Cobb-Douglas industry production 
function Q(A,X) = µAαXβ, where Q is the quantity of wholesale green coffee, A is the 
quantity of coffee bought by traders from coffee estates and X is the quantity of a 
composite input that includes transportation and processing. Profit maximization by 
traders yields input demand for marketing inputs and coffee at farm-gate, with first-
order conditions for profit maximization by traders (who also supply services X):   
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that describes the belief of 
trader i regarding how her own actions affect the total quantity of raw coffee 








. pa and px 
are the prices of coffee sold at farm-gate and marketing services, respectively. θ 
ranges from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopsony). Any value in between is 
consistent with Cournot competition. Given that traders have identical technologies 
and pay the same prices for inputs x, in equilibrium all trader’s conjectures are 
identical, so that θi = θ.  
Furthermore, assume constant elasticity of supply for both the composite input 
and coffee at farm-gate5. Taking the log of the production function as well as the 
supply and demand equations yields the following system of equations: 













=  (3.5) 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that farm supply of coffee, a tree plant, is to a large extent determined by planting 
decisions made years earlier. Quantities produced depend on the area planted as well as yield, and 
farmers typically harvest all the coffee. Thus, the short-run supply elasticity is close to zero. However, 
in the long run adjustments can be made both to acreage and inputs of fertilizers and pesticides, based 
on price expectations. Moreover, faced with liquidity constraints and being risk averse, some farmers 
exit the sector when prices become sufficiently low. Therefore, in the long-run supply elasticity is 
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wa  (3.9) 
where C = 1 + γ(1 – β) and D = (1+ ε )C – ε (1+ γ). 
Equation (3.9) expresses lnpa in terms of exogenous variables only and 
represents the market equilibrium that is the solution to the system of equations (3.3) 
– (3.7). The expression shows the relationship between the farm-gate prices and the 
export price, as well as the conjectural variation describing competition among 
traders and other exogenous variables.  
 Note that a sufficient condition for the partial derivative of lnpa with respect to 
lnpw to be positive (and to be negative with respect to θ) is production function 
exhibiting either decreasing or constant returns to scale (α + β ≤ 1). Increasing returns 
to scale could potentially result in a contra-intuitive result that farm-gate prices are 
declining in world price.  
 For further simplification assume a Cobb-Douglas production function (α + β 




























ln wa pKp  (3.10) 
where  
( ) )1ln()1(ln1ln)1( ααγαγαµγ −−++++=K  
is a combination of parameters common to all producers. Clearly, in this setting the 
price paid to growers is positively related to the world price and is negatively affected 
by noncompetitive behavior of traders captured by θ. That is, we can expect the price 
paid to growers be declining as the marketing sector moves from perfect competition 
to oligopsony.  









equals one if input supply elasticities are the same for farm input and 
marketing services, ε = γ. The elasticity is greater that one if ε < γ and less than one if 
ε > γ. That is, producer prices increase proportionally less than the world price only if 
the supply of farm input is more elastic than the supply of marketing services.     
The last term on the right-hand side of (3.10) can be approximated by a linear 
expression in θ, θ2 etc. by applying a Taylor Series expansion. Around θ = 0 


















 The first derivative of this expression with respect to θ is negative, since θ is 
between 0 and 1.  
 The empirical strategy is to verify the sign and estimate the magnitude of the 




which a distinction is made between the conjectural variation θ and the perceived 
ability of the growers to switch between different traders, which is the information 
contained in the survey. The respondents are asked whether or not they find it easy to 
switch between buyers. It can therefore be expected that θ is a function of the dummy 
variable associated with the response:  
)(Mk=θ   0)( ≤′ Mk  
buyersswitch  easy to
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where aip is the price paid to grower i at farm-gate, 
w
ip is the world market price 
corresponding to grower i, Mi is the variable describing the perceived level of 
competition among traders that purchase from i, rij are dummy variables describing 
marketing channels used by farmer i and farmer’s access to information regarding 
local prices and sih are personal and farm characteristics. 
 The idea behind including availability of information about local prices is that 
violation of the standard assumption of perfect information would affect the 
equilibrium price paid to growers. Without adequate access to information about 
prices offered by other traders in the area, the reservation value of coffee harvested 
may be very low. That is, not knowing the price that the grower may receive 
elsewhere is likely to reduce the price at which she is willing to sell her coffee. The 
hypothesis to test here is whether being better informed improves the bargaining 




 The variable wip needs to be clarified. While at any given point in time traders 
that buy coffee from growers in Karnataka face essentially the same export price,  
growers sell coffee at different times throughout the year, with most sales realized 
immediately after harvest. Fluctuations in the world market price in the course of a 
year can be considerable. That is, depending on when the farmer sells her output to 
traders, the export price could be higher or lower. Moreover, the survey is designed in 
such a way, that we only know the average price for the 2001/2002 harvest season 
realized by each producers and the quarterly distribution of sales from each farm. 
Meanwhile, price fluctuations during harvest year can be significant – producer prices 
tend to increase as supply gradually dries out after the harvest period. Average price 
received by growers as reported in the survey is therefore an annual average, 
weighted by quantities sold in each period. In order to analyze the relationship 
between farm-gate and export prices we need to make the two variables comparable. 
To do that, I construct a weighted export price for each producer, using the 
distribution of coffee sales across quarterly periods in one harvest year from the farm 
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where wtp is the world market price received in period t and ita  is the share of total 
production sold in period t.  The periods refer to first, second, third and fourth quarter 
of 2002, respectively. The resulting indicator reflects the composite export price that 




of as the average price the farmer would have received if he sold her coffee directly 
on the world market without any intermediaries. 
 Apart from equation (3.12) I also estimate a regression where producer price 










p εφψηα      (3.13) 
Note, however, that the theoretical model developed above does not warrant imposing 
the restriction that the producer price share is constant. The hypothesis that the share 
of producer price in the export price (and consequently the share of marketing margin 
in the export price) is constant in pw is tested by estimating equation (3.12) and then 
testing for β being equal to 1. 
3.5 Data 
 The cross-section farm-level data on producer prices, marketing channels, 
availability of information and grower characteristics come from a survey of coffee 
producers in Karnataka conducted by the Commodity Risk Management Group 
(CRMG) of the World Bank in cooperation with the Coffee Board of India6. The 
survey comprised five hundred farms from the hillsides of Karnataka7 where most of 
the coffee in India is grown. The responses regarding quantities produced and 
marketed refer to 2001/2002 harvest year. 
                                                 
6 Concerned with the adverse effect of the coffee price crisis on growers, the Coffee Board of India 
began investigating the opportunities for a price risk management project jointly with Canara Bank, a 
state-owned bank that provides credit to coffee planters and CRMG. The survey was intended to obtain 
market information for designing a pilot price risk insurance program and to explore the demand 
among growers and their ability to pay for price insurance 




 Most of the surveyed growers in Karnataka are smallholders – 61% have 25 
hectares or less. On average, over 90% of the estate’s area is used for coffee and 90% 
of income is derived from farming. Coffee accounts for 80% of farm income on 
average. Clearly, farmers rely on coffee for their livelihood and the impact of coffee 
prices on household income and welfare is tremendous. Other crops include pepper, 
cardamom, oranges and bananas.  
 Growers appear to have good knowledge about local prices: 96% responded 
that they knew what the price was. More than half (54%) of farmers sell all their 
coffee to traders, 18% sell all output to curers, 8% sell to agents working for 
exporters and 4% sell directly to exporters. The remaining growers sell to different 
buyers in various proportions. It is interesting to note that exporters deal 
predominantly with larger sellers, while smaller farms typically sell to local traders 
(Table 3.1). In terms of production, those growers in the survey who sell only to an 
exporter produce on average three time the quantity of coffee produced by those who 
only sell to local traders.  
 More than half of growers receive their information regarding prices 
predominantly from local traders and agents. In addition, 21% list curing plants as 
their primary source of information. Only 12% of farmers rely on newspapers for 
price information and 3% use internet. It is interesting to note, that among those who 
sell all output to traders and agents, which is the majority, most (70%) also declare 
them as the most important source of information. That is, 42.5% of all growers sell 
exclusively to local traders and also receive market information from them (Table 




on their buyer to convey the price signals. This is consistent with the claims made by 
farmers that they typically receive the price information from their buyers and lack 
access to independent sources of information. It is also interesting to note that most 
growers find that it is easy to change buyers (87.8%). However, this seems to depend 
on the location of the farm. While only 8.4% of farms that are located within 10 
kilometers from any town report difficulty with switching buyers, the proportion 
doubles to 16.1% when farms are located further. Altitude affects the level of 
competition in a similar way, since farms located above 3000 feet are twice as likely 
to report that they find it difficult to change buyer (Table 3.3).  
 Coffee is sold throughout the year, although most sales are realized within the 
first six months following the harvest (68%). Carrying over the stocks to next year is 
rare as the use of storage is limited (only 6% of farmers hold stock) due to immediate 
cash needs and fear of falling prices. On the other hand, those who kept stock did it in 
expectation of higher prices and as a form of saving. Half of all growers are members 
of a cooperative and 22% are members of both cooperative and a grower’s 
association. 
 As is evident from Table 3.4, marketing margins appear rather high in India. 
Unwashed coffee receives only 43-45% of the price realized at the auction, while 
washed coffee receives approximately 73%. The large difference in these figures is 
explained by the fact that washed coffee undergoes substantial processing at the farm 
prior to the sale, while unwashed coffee requires additional operations, as explained 




 The export price used in the analysis is the average auction price realized at 
the weekly auction of the Indian Coffee Trade Association (ICTA) in Bangalore. In 
principal, one could also use the world market prices: International Coffee 
Organization (ICO) prices, reported separately for arabica and robusta in green beans 
equivalent. However, there are two problems with using ICO prices. First, these 
prices don’t allow us to assess the gaps between the world price and farm-gate price 
separately for wet and dry-processed coffee. Second, these are not equivalent to 
India’s export prices, but average prices of traded coffee at the New York and 
London stock exchanges from few benchmark countries. The ICO indicator price 
therefore does not reflect the specific quality of Indian coffee, which would affect the 
price India receives on the world market. Using the ICTA auction price offsets these 
weaknesses, as it reflects the wholesale/export prices for each of the four groups 
marketed in India: washed Arabica, unwashed Arabica, washed Robusta and 
unwashed cherry. Although volumes traded at the auction are modest relative to 
quantities sold directly to exporters, the prices provide a good approximation of 
India’s export price at any given point in time. Coffee sold at the auction can either be 
exported or consumed domestically, however domestic prices tend to adapt to world 
market prices, given that most coffee produced in India is exported, and there is no 
export tax or other policy distortions. Thus, the ICTA prices allow us to assess the 
marketing margins in India more accurately then when using world market prices of 
coffee traded in New York and London.  
 The evolution of world market prices (ICO indicator price), ICTA auction 




2002 and 2007 is depicted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. In the case of Arabica coffee the 
price time series follow each other closely. The auction prices for both wet and dry 
processed Arabica are below the ICO indicator price, except in the end of 2006, 
which is to be expected, since the ICO Other Milds for Arabica coffee price is based 
on the prices of coffee originating from four Latin American countries typically 
associated with high quality coffee and is usually processed by the wet method only8. 
The average producer prices lie between the two ICTA prices, which is consistent 
with the fact that the grower price is calculated combining wet and dry-processed 
coffee. Turning to Robusta coffee, we note that there is a close relationship and very 
little gap between the ICO indicator, producer prices and the auction price for 
unwashed coffee, however the auction price for washed Robusta is significantly 
higher than all of them, although the fluctuations seem to follow the overall trend. 
The explanation could be that Robusta coffee in India is typically produced using the 
dry method and those few producers who use the more expensive washing method are 
inclined to do so to preserve the intrinsic quality of a particular type of coffee. In the 
sample we find evidence that those estates that trade washed Robusta are located at 
higher altitude, which is likely to have a positive impact on the quality.9  
3.6 Estimation results 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the estimation results based on equations (3.12) and (3.13), 
respectively, for all coffee types. The independent variable in Table 3.5 is the log of 
                                                 
8 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico. 
9 Coffee beans are graded according to their density, with a higher density receiving higher value. 
There is a positive correlation between coffee density and the altitude that the coffee plant is growing 
at. As a result, gourmet coffee usually encompasses coffee beans grown from Arabica coffee plants 




producer price and in Table 3.6 producer price shares are used. Note that the auction 
price used as the export price is type-specific. Three different model specifications 
are used: 1) a model that includes personal and farm characteristics, ease of switching 
buyers and price awareness, 2) a model that adds marketing channels to the above and 
3) a model that adds marketing channels and membership in a producer association. 
 The results show that when Arabica and Robusta coffees are pooled together, 
the level of competition (ease of switching buyers) does not seem to matter. 
Moreover, marketing channels don’t play a major role in determining the margin 
between producer price and export price: curers, traders and exporters do not offer 
significantly different prices to producers. The hypothesis of the elasticity of producer 
price with respect to export price being one is rejected at 5% significance in all cases. 
Neither gender nor age has significant impacts on prices received. But education level 
of growers matters: growers with secondary and university education fetch higher 
prices than those with primary education only by 4% and 5%, respectively. Distance 
to nearest town and membership in cooperatives and producer organizations do not 
seem to affect the prices when all coffee is pooled together, but altitude matters: 
higher location brings in a premium. The coefficient on knowing the local price is 
positive, but significant only at 10%. Washed coffee captures significantly larger 
share of the realized price than unwashed, which is consistent with the fact that an 
important part of the processing is done on farms and therefore the price reflects the 
returns to labor as well as equipment used for wet processing. In addition, the price of 




 Next, I estimate the same equations separately for each type of coffee traded 
on the Indian market: washed Robusta, unwashed Robusta, washed Arabica and 
unwashed Arabica. The reason for that is twofold. First, yields, production 
technology and processing methods vary substantially between Arabica and Robusta, 
which may affect how the variables in question influence prices received. For 
example, Arabica variety requires higher altitude, and since quality is typically 
positively correlated with altitude, location of the farm could affect the price 
differently depending on which type of coffee is sold. Second, there are more 
possibilities for diversification and producing higher quality and specialty coffees in 
the case of Arabica, in particular when it is wet-processed. Some of the quality 
Arabica could receive a premium on the world market, while Robusta, which is a 
cheaper and more basic variety, is a more homogenous product, and there is little 
variation in prices received by the growers. The farm-gate prices for Robusta coffee, 
in particular the unwashed kind, are therefore less likely to be driven by the quality of 
the coffee, while the price differentials in Arabica coffee could be due to quality 
dispersion, which is unobserved. I also do a Chow test for differences in coefficients 
estimated using the Arabica and Robusta coffee separately and conclude that separate 
regressions should be used (Table 3.15).  
 The results for Robusta and Arabica vary dramatically. Tables 3.7 through 
3.10 report the results for the Robusta variety. For unwashed Robusta, the main result 
is that the level of competition among traders (the perceived ease of switching 
buyers), the type of marketing channel and distance to nearest town all have 




given that most Robusta coffee in India is processed by the dry (unwashed) method. 
If a grower can easily switch buyers, it increases the price she receives by 9%, which 
indicates that greater competition substantially reduces the margin between farm-gate 
and border price. Selling the output exclusively to exporter also increases the price 
substantially: it raises the farm-gate price by 13% or 17%, depending on model 
specification, which is consistent with the expectation that fewer intermediaries in the 
marketing chain would reduce the marketing margin. Distance to nearest town has a 
significant and negative coefficient in the case of unwashed Robusta, reflecting the 
local transportation cost. The estimated coefficient implies that the price declines with 
distance to nearest town, approximately 0.3% for each kilometer. The median 
distance to town in the sample is 10 km, but 5% of all farms are located more than 28 
km from any town. If those remote farms were located 10 km to the town, they could 
receive at least 3% more for their output. Finally, growers with university education 
receive 8% higher prices than those with only primary education. The hypothesis of 
the coefficient of lnpw being one is rejected in the case of unwashed Robusta. The 
coefficient is 0.39 and significant at 5% significance level.  
 On the other hand, the elasticity of farm-gate price for washed Robusta with 
respect to export price is significantly greater than one when the full model is 
considered (Table 3.9). The coefficient on ease of switching is buyer is even higher 
than for unwashed Robusta, however it is only significant at 10% when log prices are 
used and only in the full model. It is insignificant when price share is used as the 
dependent variable (Table 3.10). The sellers of washed Robusta receive significantly 




only in the full model) or traders, rather than to curers. An interesting result is that for 
sellers of washed Robusta membership in a cooperative could increase the price by 
entire 23%, implying that growers may be able to secure a higher price if they bargain 
with market intermediaries collectively. In terms of producer price share the result is 
that cooperative membership would increase the share by 16 percent points. 
Interestingly, knowing the level of local prices does not affect the farm-gate price for 
either washed or unwashed Robusta.  
 The estimation results for Arabica are far less telling, as it can be seen from 
Tables 3.11 through 3.14. The regression for unwashed Arabica provides a very poor 
fit (only 7% of the variation in the log domestic price can be explained by the full 
model), and therefore provides no useful information regarding the interplay of the 
variables in question. The only variable with a coefficient significantly different from 
zero (at 10% significance) is the dummy for university education. When the washed 
type is considered, the only determinants of prices that are significant at 5% are 
distance to town (which has a contra-intuitive sign), altitude and the type of buyer. 
Neither the ease of switching buyers nor awareness of local prices affects producer 
prices. While these results are somewhat discouraging, they are nevertheless 
consistent with the observation that quality and consistency play a greater role in 
determining prices for Arabica coffee than for Robusta. The quality can not be 
observed directly, but quality expectations of a buyer based on a previous experience 
with the grower would certainly affect the interaction between the two. The closest 
indication we have of the quality is the altitude, and it indeed has a positive and 




Arabica growing estates is 3250 feet and the maximum is 4920 feet. Based on the 
estimated coefficient the predicted difference in prices between a higher and a lower 
location, when the difference in altitude is 1000 feet, is almost 7%. The estimated 
coefficient on distance is contra-intuitive: the price seems to increase with distance to 
nearest town. However, this could be related to the fact that the farms that are located 
at higher altitudes are also located further from towns. The type of buyer affects the 
price for washed Arabica: growers receive less if they sell all coffee to a curing plant 
rather than to an exporter or diversify their marketing channels. 
 A further exploration into competition among marketing intermediaries 
through maximum likelihood estimation of a probit model reveals that the ease of 
switching buyers depends on the location of the farm (Table 3.16): the probability 
that it would be easy to choose among traders declines with the distance to nearest 
town and altitude. This indicates, at least in the case of unwashed Robusta, that 
remote farms not only receive lower prices because of the transportation costs, but 
also because fewer traders operate in the area and would take advantage of the market 
power they possess. 
 There are two possible explanations for the relatively poor fit of some models, 
in particular for unwashed Robusta and Arabica. First, any model that attempts to 
explain the price differentials across producers will inevitably suffer from unobserved 
heterogeneity related to quality. Although there is reportedly little variation in the 
quality of coffee produced in Karnataka and coffee is sold ungraded by growers, as 
explained in Section 3.3, traders are likely to have certain expectations about the 




interactions of the grower, traders and exporters would form expectations regarding 
the average grade of coffee from each location and pay each estate accordingly. 
Moreover, traders value consistency (uniform quality and timely delivery) and could 
have the incentive to reward consistent suppliers through higher prices to prevent 
them from switching to other buyers. Since quality and consistency are not 
observable, this fact could affect the results. Second, the empirical strategy relied on 
relating average producer price to the average auction price based on quarterly sales. 
However, there may be significant fluctuations in price from one month to another 
and this would not be captured by the data, since monthly distribution of sales is 
unknown. For example, from October to November 2002 (the year of the survey), the 
world market price for Robusta, as well as the average producer price across India, 
jumped 14%. A grower that sold more of his coffee in October would be expected to 
receive a lower average price than someone who sold more output in November. 
3.7 Conclusions 
 This paper provides an empirical analysis of producer prices in the Karnataka 
state. The principal result is that determinants of prices vary substantially by the type 
of coffee trader. The overall results are therefore mixed. The empirical findings 
indicate that the prices for Arabica coffee are driven by the unobserved quality of the 
coffee more than by marketing conditions. Arabica coffee exhibits both higher 
average prices and a greater spread in premiums than Robusta coffee, which is a more 
homogeneous commodity. In the case of Robusta, in particular the most common 
unwashed type, the evidence is that ease of switching buyers, which is indicative of 




prices to growers, consistent with the theory.  The implied price increase associated 
with the shift towards a greater competition among traders in line with the findings in 
Lopez and You (1993b), who find that the move from oligopsony to perfect 
competition in Haiti would increase farm-level prices by 17%, although the 
magnitude of this effect is found to be smaller.  
 While almost 90% of growers in the survey find it easy to switch buyers, there 
are still some remote farms that not only lose income due to higher transportation 
costs, but also experience distortions associated with monopsonistic competition. The 
analysis also points towards the value of education: those with university education 
are able to negotiate higher prices. In some cases (washed Robusta) we find that 
membership in a cooperative has a tremendous impact on prices, presumably though 
collective bargaining and the scale effect of pooling the coffee together. The evidence 
is also mixed regarding the effect of transportation costs on prices: only in the case of 
Robusta we find that prices decline with distance to nearest town.  
 The fact that altitude has a positive effect on price is driven by the relationship 
between the altitude-dependent climatic conditions the taste of the coffee, as found in 
other studies, for example in Avelino et.al. (2005) for Costa Rica.  
 The type of marketing intermediary seems to matter for equilibrium prices, 
but the results vary by coffee type: sellers of unwashed Robusta receive highest prices 
from exporters; washed Robusta is more profitably sold to traders, and in the case of 
washed Arabica it pays off to sell through outlets other than curing plants. Thus, the 
often expressed claim that passing intermediaries by selling directly to exporters 




finding naturally raises the question why all growers, knowing that different 
intermediaries offer different prices, do not simply choose the most profitable outlet? 
A possible reason could be that not everyone is able to establish a relationship with a 
well-paying buyer. Most major exporters require consistent quality and relatively 
large volumes of trade. It is therefore harder for a smallholder to sell directly to 
exporters. Collective negotiation of contracts and pooling of coffee for marketing at 


















































Table 3.1 Marketing and farm size 
 
Buyer <=25 acres >25 acres Total
Exporter 0.8% 3.0% 3.8%
Exporter agent 6.0% 1.8% 7.8%
Curing plant 7.2% 10.4% 17.6%
Local trader 41.0% 12.8% 53.8%
Mix 6.4% 10.6% 17.0%





Table 3.2 Marketing and source of information 
 
Buyer Exporter Curing plant Trader/agent Internet Newspaper Other Total
Exporters 1.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.2% 0.4% 3.8%
Curing plants 1.0% 9.2% 4.0% 0.8% 1.8% 0.8% 17.6%
Trader/agent 1.0% 6.8% 42.4% 0.2% 9.0% 2.2% 61.6%
Mix 2.2% 4.8% 6.4% 1.4% 1.2% 1.0% 17.0%
Total 6.0% 21.2% 53.2% 3.0% 12.2% 4.4% 100.0%















Table 3.4 Average producer price share by coffee type  
 
Arabica Robusta
Dry processed 44.6% 42.5%
Wet processed 72.5% 73.3%
Ease of switching buyers < 10 km >= 10 km < 3000 feet >= 3000 feet
Not easy 8.4% 16.1% 7.4% 15.9%
Easy 91.6% 83.9% 92.6% 84.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%




Table 3.5 Determinants of farm-gate prices: All coffee 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Export price (ln) 0.3553 *** (0.1186) 0.3483 *** (0.1191) 0.3436 *** (0.1194)
Dummy washed arabica 0.7364 *** (0.0475) 0.7393 *** (0.0477) 0.7405 *** (0.0478)
Dummy unwashed robusta -0.2393 *** (0.0385) -0.2441 *** (0.0386) -0.2449 *** (0.0388)
Dummy washed robusta 0.4284 *** (0.0234) 0.4279 *** (0.0236) 0.4277 *** (0.0237)
Dummy secondary education 0.0377 ** (0.0173) 0.0369 ** (0.0173) 0.0386 ** (0.0174)
Dummy university education 0.0522 *** (0.0177) 0.0550 *** (0.0178) 0.0571 *** (0.0180)
Gender (female=0; male=1) -0.0028 (0.0233) -0.0060 (0.0233) -0.0048 (0.0234)
Age 0.0027 (0.0026) 0.0025 (0.0026) 0.0027 (0.0026)
Age squared -1.2E-05 (2.3E-05) -1.1E-05 (2.3E-05) -1.1E-05 (2.3E-05)
Distance to nearest town 0.0004 (0.0005) 0.0005 (0.0005) 0.0005 (0.0005)
Altitude 3.9E-05 *** (1.2E-05) 3.9E-05 *** (1.2E-05) 3.7E-05 *** (1.2E-05)
Dummy ease of switching buyer 0.0105 (0.0149) 0.0115 (0.0149) 0.0098 (0.0150)
Dummy know price 0.0388 * (0.0212) 0.0388 * (0.0213) 0.0387 * (0.0213)
Dummy member of cooperative -0.0002 (0.0097)
Dummy member of grower association -0.0080 (0.0101)
Dummy member of other producer organization -0.0197 (0.0130)
Dummy sold to curer -0.0122 (0.0143) -0.0158 (0.0145)
Dummy sold to exporter 0.0320 (0.0247) 0.0361 (0.0261)
Dummy sold to trader 0.0086 (0.0119) 0.0045 (0.0124)
Constant 3.7036 *** (0.8909) 3.7583 *** (0.8958) 3.8002 *** (0.8982)
No of observations 865 865 861
R-squared 0.937 0.937 0.937
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
y: ln(pd) y: ln(pd) y: ln(pd)
 
 
Table 3.6 Determinants of producer price share: All coffee 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Dummy washed arabica 0.2772 *** (0.0060) 0.2773 *** (0.0060) 0.2771 *** (0.0060)
Dummy unwashed robusta -0.0119 * (0.0066) -0.0135 ** (0.0067) -0.0135 ** (0.0068)
Dummy washed robusta 0.2934 *** (0.0110) 0.2942 *** (0.0111) 0.2944 *** (0.0111)
Dummy secondary education 0.0192 ** (0.0094) 0.0191 ** (0.0094) 0.0202 ** (0.0094)
Dummy university education 0.0204 ** (0.0096) 0.0222 ** (0.0096) 0.0237 ** (0.0097)
Gender (female=0; male=1) 0.0020 (0.0126) 0.0007 (0.0126) 0.0016 (0.0127)
Age 0.0007 (0.0014) 0.0006 (0.0014) 0.0007 (0.0014)
Age squared -1.1E-06 (1.3E-05) 1.5E-07 (1.3E-05) -9.6E-08 (1.3E-05)
Distance to nearest town 0.0005 (0.0003) 0.0005 * (0.0003) 0.0005 * (0.0003)
Altitude 3E-05 *** (6.4-06) 3E-05 *** (6.4-06) 3E-05 *** (6.5E-06)
Dummy ease of switching buyer 0.0023 (0.0081) 0.0029 (0.0081) 0.0023 (0.0081)
Dummy know price 0.0188 (0.0115) 0.0196 * (0.0116) 0.0198 * (0.0116)
Dummy member of cooperative 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0014 (0.0053)
Dummy member of grower association 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0066 (0.0055)
Dummy member of other producer organization 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0061 (0.0070)
Dummy sold to curer -0.0028 (0.0078) -0.0046 (0.0079)
Dummy sold to exporter 0.0148 (0.0134) 0.0169 (0.0142)
Dummy sold to trader 0.0085 (0.0064) 0.0058 (0.0067)
Constant 0.2766 *** (0.0464) 0.2729 *** (0.0468) 0.2772 *** (0.0470)
No of observations 865 865 861
R-squared 0.800 0.801 0.801
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%




Table 3.7 Determinants of farm-gate prices: Unwashed Robusta  
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Export price (ln) 0.4304 ** (0.1801) 0.4226 ** (0.1799) 0.3908 ** (0.1816)
Dummy type of processing (unwashed=0; washed=1)
Dummy secondary education 0.0464 (0.0370) 0.0441 (0.0373) 0.0398 (0.0377)
Dummy university education 0.0786 ** (0.0385) 0.0806 ** (0.0388) 0.0805 ** (0.0392)
Gender (female=0; male=1) -0.0279 (0.0431) -0.0311 (0.0430) -0.0301 (0.0433)
Age 0.0017 (0.0062) 0.0011 (0.0062) 0.0017 (0.0063)
Age squared -3.2E-06 (5.5E-05) 2.6E-06 (5.5E-05) -2.1E-06 (5.6E-05)
Distance to nearest town -0.0035 *** (0.0013) -0.0035 ** (0.0013) -0.0033 ** (0.0014)
Altitude 2.9E-06 (3.2E-05) -1.6E-06 (3.2E-05) -5.9E-06 (3.3E-05)
Dummy ease of switching buyer 0.0929 *** (0.0354) 0.0905 ** (0.0353) 0.0867 ** (0.0355)
Dummy know price 0.0655 (0.0496) 0.0643 (0.0496) 0.0648 (0.0498)
Dummy member of cooperative 0.0241 (0.0230)
Dummy member of grower association -0.0115 (0.0224)
Dummy member of other producer organization -0.0241 (0.0259)
Dummy sold to curer 0.0212 0.0189 (0.0390)
Dummy sold to exporter 0.1319 ** 0.1708 ** (0.0718)
Dummy sold to trader 0.0272 0.0171 (0.0281)
Constant 2.9943 ** (1.3010) 3.0628 ** (1.3011) 3.2889 ** (1.3123)
No of observations 239 239 238
R-squared 0.138 0.154 0.166
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
y: ln(pd) y: ln(pd) y: ln(pd)
 
 
Table 3.8 Determinants of producer price share: Unwashed Robusta  
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Dummy secondary education 0.0198 (0.0161) 0.0196 (0.0165) 0.0178 (0.0165)
Dummy university education 0.0262 (0.0167) 0.0271 (0.0170) 0.0262 (0.0170)
Gender (female=0; male=1) -0.0145 (0.0187) -0.0159 (0.0189) 0.0161 (0.0189)
Age 0.0004 (0.0027) 0.0002 (0.0028) 0.0004 (0.0028)
Age squared -2.5E-07 (2.4E-05) 1.9E-06 (2.4E-05) 4.4E-07 (2.4E-05)
Distance to nearest town -0.0015 ** (0.0006) -0.0015 ** (0.0006) 0.0015 ** (0.0006)
Altitude 4.6E-06 (1.4E-05) 2.6E-06 (1.4E-05) 1.0E-06 (1.4E-05)
Dummy ease of switching buyer 0.0346 ** (0.0153) 0.0335 ** (0.0154) 0.0321 ** (0.0154)
Dummy know price 0.0272 (0.0216) 0.0264 (0.0217) 0.0263 (0.0217)
Dummy member of cooperative 0.0083 (0.0100)
Dummy member of grower association 0.0016 (0.0098)
Dummy member of other producer organization 0.0098 (0.0113)
Dummy sold to curer 0.0133 (0.0170) 0.0126 (0.0170)
Dummy sold to exporter 0.0528 * (0.0313) 0.0683 ** (0.0313)
Dummy sold to trader 0.0112 (0.0123) 0.0084 (0.0123)
Constant 0.3420 *** (0.0923) 0.3432 *** (0.0923)
No of observations 239 239 238
R-squared 0.082 0.096 0.106
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%






Table 3.9 Determinants of farm-gate prices: Washed Robusta 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Export price (ln) 0.9102 * (0.5267) 1.1849 ** (0.5715) 1.6236 *** (0.5555)
Dummy type of processing (unwashed=0; washed=1)
Dummy secondary education 0.2125 (0.1569) 0.1934 (0.1569) 0.1237 (0.1488)
Dummy university education 0.2208 (0.1478) 0.1728 (0.1472) 0.1483 (0.1369)
Gender (female=0; male=1) 0.2596 * (0.1510) 0.2377 (0.1520) 0.1851 (0.1416)
Age 0.0304 (0.0232) -0.0286 (0.0229) -0.0256 (0.0210)
Age squared 2.9E-04 (2.1E-04) 2.7E-04 (2.0E-04) 2.5E-04 (1.9E-04)
Distance to nearest town 0.0014 (0.0043) 0.0022 (0.0043) 0.0038 (0.0039)
Altitude 4.7E-05 (1.0E-04) -5.0E-05 (1.0E-04) -1.5E-04 (9.9E-05)
Dummy ease of switching buyer 0.0708 (0.1213) 0.1095 (0.1214) 0.2134 * (0.1153)
Dummy know price 0.4912 (0.2996) -0.3915 (0.3107) -0.3933 (0.2806)
Dummy member of cooperative 0.2345 *** (0.0701)
Dummy member of grower association -0.0067 (0.0769)
Dummy member of other producer organization -0.0789 (0.0801)
Dummy sold to curer 0.0523 0.0764 (0.0706)
Dummy sold to exporter 0.1106 0.1815 * (0.1034)
Dummy sold to trader 0.1417 * 0.1828 *** (0.0656)
Constant 1.1840 (3.8120) -1.0446 (4.1754) -4.1926 (4.0284)
No of observations 53 53 53
R-squared 0.182 0.265 0.450
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%




Table 3.10 Determinants of producer price share: Washed Robusta  
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Dummy secondary education 0.1623 (0.1107) 0.1386 (0.1037) 0.0801 (0.1037)
Dummy university education 0.1731 (0.1051) 0.1353 (0.0967) 0.1193 (0.0967)
Gender (female=0; male=1) 0.1514 (0.1032) 0.1210 (0.0961) 0.0648 (0.0961)
Age -0.0294 * (0.0160) -0.0262 (0.0144) -0.0211 (0.0144)
Age squared 2.8E-04 * (1.4E-04) 2.5E-04 * (1.4E-04) 2.1E-04 (1.3E-04)
Distance to nearest town 0.0015 (0.0030) 0.0018 (0.0027) 0.0024 (0.0027)
Altitude -1.8E-05 (7.3E-05) -2.0E-05 (7.3E-05) -9.6E-05 (7.0E-05)
Dummy ease of switching buyer 0.0519 (0.0833) 0.0724 (0.0785) 0.1263 (0.0785)
Dummy know price -0.3180 (0.1985) -0.1977 (0.1840) -0.1365 (0.1840)
Dummy member of cooperative 0.1641 *** (0.0490)
Dummy member of grower association -0.0090 (0.0533)
Dummy member of other producer organization -0.0719 (0.0554)
Dummy sold to curer 0.0317 (0.0455) 0.0311 (0.0455)
Dummy sold to exporter 0.0592 (0.0696) 0.0939 (0.0696)
Dummy sold to trader 0.1042 ** (0.0448) 0.1223 ** (0.0448)
Constant 1.2575 ** (0.4241) 1.2566 *** (0.4241)
No of observations 53 53 53
R-squared 0.210 0.297 0.475
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%





Table 3.11 Determinants of farm-gate prices: Unwashed Arabica  
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Export price (ln) 0.3880 (0.3543) 0.3705 (0.3573) 0.3888 (0.3590)
Dummy type of processing (unwashed=0; washed=1)
Dummy secondary education 0.0398 (0.0272) 0.0397 (0.0274) 0.0406 (0.0276)
Dummy university education 0.0491 * (0.0279) 0.0509 * (0.0282) 0.0493 * (0.0287)
Gender (female=0; male=1) -0.0407 (0.0434) -0.0432 (0.0438) -0.0410 (0.0442)
Age 0.0052 (0.0041) 0.0052 (0.0041) 0.0053 (0.0042)
Age squared -3.5E-05 (3.6E-05) -3.5E-05 (3.7E-05) -3.6E-05 (3.7E-05)
Distance to nearest town 0.0011 (0.0008) 0.0011 (0.0009) 0.0010 (0.0009)
Altitude 1.5E-05 (1.8E-05) 1.6E-05 (1.8E-05) 1.5E-05 (1.9E-05)
Dummy ease of switching buyer -0.0116 (0.0236) -0.0121 (0.0240) -0.0141 (0.0241)
Dummy know price 0.0468 (0.0320) 0.0459 (0.0323) 0.0446 (0.0325)
Dummy member of cooperative -0.0012 (0.0160)
Dummy member of grower association 0.0056 (0.0166)
Dummy member of other producer organization -0.0345 (0.0223)
Dummy sold to curer -0.0120 -0.0151 (0.0236)
Dummy sold to exporter 0.0026 0.0081 (0.0427)
Dummy sold to trader -0.0010 -0.0015 (0.0207)
Constant 3.5137 (2.6561) 3.6470 (2.6797) 3.5113 (2.6925)
No of observations 293 293 292
R-squared 0.060 0.061 0.070
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
y: ln(pd) y: ln(pd) y: ln(pd)
 
 
Table 3.12 Determinants of producer price share: Unwashed Arabica  
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Dummy secondary education 0.0172 (0.0109) 0.0172 (0.0111) 0.0175 (0.0111)
Dummy university education 0.0172 (0.0111) 0.0180 (0.0114) 0.0175 (0.0114)
Gender (female=0; male=1) -0.0212 (0.0172) -0.0221 (0.0176) -0.0209 (0.0176)
Age 0.0020 (0.0016) 0.0020 (0.0017) 0.0021 (0.0017)
Age squared -1.4E-05 (1.5E-05) -1.3E-05 (1.5E-05) -1.4E-05 (1.5E-05)
Distance to nearest town 0.0004 (0.0003) 0.0004 (0.0003) 0.0004 (0.0003)
Altitude 6.0E-06 (7.2E-06) 6.4E-06 (7.3E-06) 5.7E-06 (7.4E-06)
Dummy ease of switching buyer -0.0037 (0.0094) -0.0040 (0.0097) -0.0043 (0.0097)
Dummy know price 0.0224 * (0.0128) 0.0224 * (0.0130) 0.0224 * (0.0130)
Dummy member of cooperative -0.0027 (0.0064)
Dummy member of grower association 0.0003 (0.0067)
Dummy member of other producer organization -0.0079 (0.0089)
Dummy sold to curer -0.0038 (0.0094) -0.0050 (0.0094)
Dummy sold to exporter -0.0008 (0.0171) 0.0027 (0.0171)
Dummy sold to trader 0.0006 (0.0083) 0.0000 (0.0083)
Constant 0.3422 *** (0.0550) 0.3426 *** (0.0550)
No of observations 293 293 292
R-squared 0.056 0.057 0.061
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%




Table 3.13 Determinants of farm-gate prices: Washed Arabica  
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Export price (ln) -0.1008 (0.2113) -0.1734 (0.2131) -0.1852 (0.2142)
Dummy type of processing (unwashed=0; washed=1)
Dummy secondary education 0.0133 (0.0231) 0.0153 (0.0230) 0.0149 (0.0230)
Dummy university education 0.0209 (0.0236) 0.0273 (0.0236) 0.0273 (0.0238)
Gender (female=0; male=1) 0.0469 (0.0332) 0.0389 (0.0330) 0.0465 (0.0333)
Age 0.0022 (0.0032) 0.0028 (0.0032) 0.0032 (0.0032)
Age squared -1.1E-05 (2.8E-05) -1.7E-05 (2.8E-05) -1.9E-05 (2.9E-05)
Distance to nearest town 0.0017 ** (0.0007) 0.0016 ** (0.0007) 0.0015 ** (0.0007)
Altitude 7.0E-05 *** (1.4E-05) 7.2E-05 *** (1.4E-05) 6.8E-05 *** (1.5E-05)
Dummy ease of switching buyer -0.0218 (0.0182) -0.0257 (0.0182) -0.0283 (0.0184)
Dummy know price 0.0035 (0.0271) -0.0041 (0.0270) -0.0042 (0.0270)
Dummy member of cooperative -0.0237 * (0.0124)
Dummy member of grower association -0.0024 (0.0128)
Dummy member of other producer organization -0.0049 (0.0182)
Dummy sold to curer -0.0490 *** -0.0541 *** (0.0178)
Dummy sold to exporter -0.0143 -0.0274 (0.0323)
Dummy sold to trader -0.0246 -0.0258 (0.0157)
Constant 7.9918 *** (1.6762) 8.5836 *** (1.6928) 8.6849 *** (1.7013)
No of observations 280 280 278
R-squared 0.175 0.198 0.211
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
y: ln(pd) y: ln(pd) y: ln(pd)
 
 
Table 3.14 Determinants of producer price share: Washed Arabica  
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Dummy secondary education 0.0089 (0.0173) 0.0105 (0.0174) 0.0108 (0.0174)
Dummy university education 0.0079 (0.0176) 0.0119 (0.0179) 0.0132 (0.0179)
Gender (female=0; male=1) 0.0313 (0.0248) 0.0267 (0.0251) 0.0312 (0.0251)
Age 0.0019 (0.0024) 0.0022 (0.0024) 0.0025 (0.0024)
Age squared -1.2E-05 (2.2E-05) -1.5E-05 (2.1E-05) -1.6E-05 (2.1E-05)
Distance to nearest town 0.0013 *** (0.0005) 0.0013 ** (0.0005) 0.0012 ** (0.0005)
Altitude 5.7E-05 *** (1.1E-05) 5.9E-05 *** (1.1E-05) 5.6E-05 *** (1.1E-05)
Dummy ease of switching buyer -0.0156 (0.0136) -0.0179 (0.0138) -0.0192 (0.0138)
Dummy know price 0.0080 (0.0202) 0.0050 (0.0203) 0.0054 (0.0203)
Dummy member of cooperative -0.0159 * (0.0093)
Dummy member of grower association -0.0079 (0.0097)
Dummy member of other producer organization -0.0017 (0.0137)
Dummy sold to curer -0.0262 ** (0.0134) -0.0300 ** (0.0134)
Dummy sold to exporter -0.0128 (0.0244) -0.0195 (0.0244)
Dummy sold to trader -0.0088 (0.0117) -0.0113 (0.0117)
Constant 0.4295 *** (0.0800) 0.4399 *** (0.0800)
No of observations 280 280 278
R-squared 0.184 0.197 0.210
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%




Table 3.15 Chow test for coefficients being the same for Robusta and Arabica 
 













5% critical value of F(18,825) 1.59




Table 3.16 Probit estimation: Ease of switching buyers 
 
Probit estimates Number of obs 904    
 LR chi2(2) 49.49    
 Prob > chi2 0    
Log likelihood = -
309.97248 Pseudo R2 0.0739    
      
      
  dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar 
      
Distance -0.00307 0.00108 -2.86 0.004 11.5 
Altitude -0.00012 0.00002 -5.22 0.000 3146.1 
            
      





Chapter 4: Attitude to risk and informal insurance 
4.1 Introduction 
Coffee price volatility has a negative and even disastrous impact on welfare of coffee 
farmers, income distribution and poverty. The consequence of price instability goes 
beyond contemporaneous effects on input use, production and incomes. Producer 
welfare is also affected in the medium to long-term, since uncertainty makes it 
difficult for farmers to make adequate production decisions, obtain credit and 
maintain reliable marketing relations. During particularly abrupt income shocks, such 
as during the recent coffee price crisis during 2000-2003, some farmers even abandon 
their plantations. Moreover, given the importance of coffee farming in some 
economies, price volatility often has a negative impact on economic growth at 
regional and national levels. In the past, attempts were made to deal with price 
instability through collusion among coffee-producing countries and domestic 
government interventions that targeted price stabilization. In most cases stabilization 
was either unsuccessful or very difficult and costly to maintain in the long run. 
However, it did provide some degree of protection to producers, albeit at high 
transaction costs and adding uncertainty associated with ad-hoc policy decisions. In 
the post-liberalization environment, where producer prices are more closely 
integrated with world prices, and in the face of a price collapse, farmers are more 
exposed and vulnerable to price risks than before market reforms. There is therefore 
growing interest in new, market-based instruments for reducing coffee risks. 




Access to these products by smallholder farmers, who are the majority of coffee 
growers, is constrained by lack of information and proper understanding of these 
instruments, high transactions costs relative to small volumes of trade and absence of 
institutions that could act as intermediaries between growers and international 
hedging markets. 
 In some countries, the local banks and industry regulatory bodies have taken 
the initiative to set up programs intended to reduce the volatility of growers’ income. 
Coffee is well suited for application of the new price risk management instruments 
since it is characterized by high price volatility and because the well-established 
international commodity futures markets offers possibilities for producers to manage 
the price risk by hedging on these markets. One example is introduction of a 
collateral management program for production risk combined with options contracts 
to reduce price volatility by a local bank in Tanzania (World Bank, 2005a). A pilot 
price insurance scheme for small farmers was set up in Nicaragua with the help of the  
International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management, a World Bank initiative, 
and replicated in some other countries.  
 In India, the gradual implementation of market reforms from 1992-1996 
enhanced the efficiency of domestic coffee trading, but left producers without any 
formal risk management tools. This year for the first time an index-based weather 
insurance was introduced by the Agricultural Insurance Company of India and the 
Coffee Board. Why did it take ten years after market liberalization to come up with 
this type of instruments? The answer lies in the characteristics of the Indian coffee 




hand, the transaction costs of supplying risk reduction products are too high relative 
to the size of operations: an overwhelming majority of coffee growers are 
smallholders. There are no institutions in place that could act as intermediaries 
between smallholders and global markets to allow them to hedge. However, demand 
is also constrained: Farmers are rather wary of the new financial products. Their 
perception of globalization is rather negative, because growers blame it for the 
collapse of coffee prices, and they often mistrust the government. It short, there are 
two major constraints: lack of scale and lack of transparency regarding product 
options and their benefits. Thus, the role of the state in coffee production and 
marketing is reinvented: Rather than being directly involved in those activities, public 
entities, such as the Coffee Board, could now act as facilitators, educators and 
transmitters of information. Local institutions such as banks and producer 
cooperatives also have an important role to play, since they constitute vibrant formal 
and informal networks through which risk management products can be distributed 
and popularized. These networks stand to gain from mitigating income risks to 
producers since the welfare of their members or customers would positively affect 
their contribution: For example, repayment rates on loans are closely correlated with 
income stability.  
 However, even with strong support from national and local institutions, and 
technical support from the World Bank and other organizations, the progress in 
establishing functioning insurance mechanisms has been uneven. To understand the 
reason for this on the demand side, it would be useful to take a closer look at two 




premiums on price insurance? Second, how do farmers deal with risks in the absence 
of formal insurance? In other words, what are their alternatives in terms of informal 
risk management practices?  
 This paper studies a hypothetical price insurance scheme suggested to coffee 
growers in Karnataka, the main coffee producing state in India. Using the data from a 
survey specifically designed to establish demand for such insurance, the paper 
attempts to answer the two research questions outlined above.  
4.2 Existing evidence on risk aversion and participation in insurance  
What drives participation in crop insurance? The conventional justification for 
the use of hedging instruments in agriculture is risk reduction for farmers that are 
characterized by aversion to risk. However, the vast literature shows that there are 
two other major considerations that motivate farmers to insure. First, farmers may be 
inclined to purchase insurance if they expect their mean income to increase as the 
result. Second, participation is motivated by informational asymmetries between 
growers and insurers, which give rise to moral hazard problems. As Just et. al. (1999) 
show, crop insurance incentives can be decomposed in into risk-aversion (hedging), 
subsidy (actuarial) and asymmetric information incentives. The authors use U.S. 
multiple peril crop insurance data to show that insurance participation is primarily 
determined by subsidies and asymmetric information considerations.  
 Numerous studies analyzed the demand for price hedging with futures and 
options by agricultural producers that face both price and yield uncertainty. For 
example, Rolfe (1980) derived the optimal use of futures as a hedging instrument for 




futures, in reducing agricultural risks in the presence of production uncertainty and 
simulated optimal hedge using the data for Iowa corn growers. Mahul (2003) 
examined the use of options and futures by French farmers when both yield and 
revenue insurance are available.  
 In development economics, agricultural risks and insurance receive 
particularly close  attention, both because poor agents are taken to be more risk averse 
(assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, which is supported by experimental and 
empirical evidence) and because market failures in developing countries prevent 
farmers from achieving an adequate level of insurance. The use of price risk 
management tools for commodity producers in developing counties has been 
advocated by development scholars and widely promoted by international financial 
organizations and the donor community (Varangis and Larson, 1996; Sarris 2003; 
World Bank, 2005a).  However, the rate of participation in these risk-hedging 
schemes tends to be low. In India, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) predict weak 
participation in rainfall insurance. This finding is supported by empirical evidence in 
a recent paper Giné et.al. (2007), who explicitly analyze the determinants of rainfall 
insurance participation in India. The survey data they used indicate that farmers who 
decline rainfall insurance do so predominantly because of a low level of familiarity 
with the product or due to a liquidity constraint. Contrary to theoretical predictions, 
they find that risk averse households are less likely to purchase insurance. The 
authors offer an explanation to this puzzle, which is that the results reflect uncertainty 
about the insurance product itself. Analyzing price risks for Costa Rican coffee 




and accurately predict coffee prices. The potential gains of price hedging with futures 
are therefore considered to be relatively modest. 
 An important empirical question in this context is the prevalence and 
magnitude of risk aversion in a low-income rural setting. Evaluation of the risk 
aversion parameter is typically done using experimental design with lotteries, 
pioneered by Binswanger (1980) and subsequently applied in a number of developing 
countries, most recently by Harrison et.al. (2007). A wealth of empirical evidence 
suggests that farmers indeed are risk averse, and the poor ones even more so. It 
should be noted that these experiments are not easily applied to riskiness of income 
from agricultural activity, since farm income is subject to multiple sources of 
uncertainty that could be correlated. Typically, prices and yields are correlated, which 
could either reduce or exacerbate the overall income risk. Therefore, focusing on only 
one type of risk at a time and ignoring the price-yield correlation would produce 
erroneous results. On the other hand, the use of revealed preference data for 
estimation of agricultural risks and risk aversion can also be problematic. As Just and 
Just (2007) convincingly demonstrate, imposing specific functional forms on the 
utility function and distribution of stochastic variables, as it is commonly done, may 
in fact determine the estimated structure of risk preferences that fits the data.  
 A related and equally important question in the case of rural producers is what 
risk-reducing strategies do risk averse farmers adopt in the absence of crop insurance 
or other  arrangements that directly affect farm income? Studies suggest that low-
income rural communities have a number of formal and informal mechanisms at their 




provides a brief overview). Evidence from rural India suggests that, as consumption-
stabilizing strategies, producers resort to intra-household income transfers 
(Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), shifting labor from farm to off-
farm employment (Kochar 1999), risk- sharing through informal community-based 
institutions (Townsend, 1994) or through informal credit arrangements (Bell et.al., 
1999). Clearly, these strategies are only useful for shocks that do not affect all 
members at once, and are ineffective if the unit of risk pooling (village or region) is 
vulnerable to the same aggregate risk, such as price fall or drought.  
 The contribution of this chapter to the literature is two-fold: First, it offers a 
simple methodology for detecting risk aversion using farmers’ responses on 
maximum premiums they would be willing to pay for price insurance. Second, it 
provides empirical evidence of the use of informal mechanisms that contribute to 
either risk mitigation or consumption smoothing in absence of formal insurance, 
when farmers are risk averse. 
4.3 Sources of income volatility and risk management tools 
4.3.1 Incidence of risk in the Indian coffee sector 
Indian coffee growers face multiple sources of income volatility, typically related to 
either price or yield risk. Risks can be systemic, local or idiosyncratic. Systemic risks 
affect a large number of growers at the same time. Fluctuations in world prices, 
droughts and floods are typical examples. An example of a local risk shared by 
producers in a limited geographical area is the amount of rainfall. Idiosyncratic risks 





 Production and yields of coffee in India from 1986 to 2006 are shown in 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2. An upward trend in production is evident for both Arabica and 
Robusta, reflecting increases in planted area, while yields have been fluctuating with 
little change in the trend over time. In the last few years yields of both Arabica and 
Robusta have declined relative to 2001, presumably in response to a slump in global 
prices. Both production and yield of Robusta appear to be more volatile than in 
Arabica. The coefficient of variation (CV, the ratio of standard deviation to the mean) 
of annual yields in 1986-2006 has been 17.2% for Arabica and 35.8% for Robusta. 
 Price risk is the second most important risk reported by Karnataka growers. 
Annual fluctuations of price levels from 1986 to 2005 are shown in Figure 4.3. Four 
sets of prices are displayed: world prices of Arabica and Robusta as well as producer 
prices in India for both types. All prices were collected by the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO).  In the case of Arabica a combination of average spot prices of 
“Other Mild” coffee traded daily in the New York and Hamburg markets is used as 
the world market price. In the case of Robusta, the international price is the 
combination of average spot price of “Robusta” coffee traded daily in the New York 
and Le Havre/Marseilles markets10. Producer prices are the average farm-gate prices 
for all grades reported by Indian authorities to ICO. All prices have been deflated 
using the CPI for India (2000=100). As shown in the figure, coffee prices declined at 
the time of collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989, but rose 
following the frosts and drought in Brazil in 1994. Overall, the prices have been quite 
volatile until 1999, when the last coffee price crisis began. From 1999 to 2003 prices 
                                                 
10 The share of each market in the two groups is as follows: 
• Other Milds: 40% New York; 60% Hamburg 




were on a steady decline, and from 2003 have been on a recovery path. The average 
share of producer prices in the world market price between 1986 and 2006 was 77% 
and 68% for Robusta and Arabica, respectively. Producer prices have been less 
volatile than world prices, measured by the coefficient of variation (CV). The CVs of 
annual world prices in 1986-2005 are 0.49 and 0.37 for Robusta and Arabica, 
respectively, while the CVs for producer prices in the same period are 0.34 and 0.30. 
Variability of producer prices within a year can be observed in Figure 4.4, where the 
CVs for the monthly prices within each year are plotted. This intrayear variability has 
been highest in the early 1990’s, and is on average higher for Robusta than for 
Arabica (0.13 vesus 0.11). 
 Producer price fluctuations are determined by a number of causes. First and 
perhaps most important in the case of coffee, producer prices are affected by 
fluctuations in world market prices caused by shocks to global supply and demand. 
The world price is impacted by agreements among coffee producing countries, entry 
of new major suppliers and the demand patterns in consuming countries. India has no 
export restrictions on coffee and most coffee is exported. Therefore producer prices 
tend to follow world market price. Second, producer prices are sensitive to the local 
market conditions, such as barriers to entry in the marketing sector, collusion among 
traders and access to timely information, as discussed in the precious chapter. Third, 
producer prices fluctuate in response to government policy affecting production and 
marketing of coffee. 
 As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, liberalization had a significant  




in 1996 the share of producer prices in the world price increased significantly and the 
price paid to growers adjusts faster today to changing market conditions. Before 
market reforms the Coffee Board of India had marketed all coffee in India. It is 
commonly assumed that state trading benefits price stability through stabilization 
policies such as minimum prices. In the case of India, pooled prices and variable 
export tax rates provided some protection for growers. However, these policies did 
not appear to provide  reduction of the price risk. Price data show that prices were 
actually more volatile before the reforms. The CV of monthly producer prices prior to 
1996 was 0.42 and 0.40 for Robusta and Arabica, respectively, and the corresponding 
measures were 0.37 and 0.34 between 1996 and 2005.  
 A bigger problem for producers than monthly fluctuations is posed by 
extended periods of low prices, as in the case of the recent coffee price crisis. The 
downward trend in prices began in 1999 and intensified over 2001 and 2002. At the 
lowest point in 2002 producer prices had fallen to 39% of the average of prices during 
the 1990’s for Robusta and 49% for Arabica. The price crash had implications for the 
Indian coffee industry and for growers in particular. A typical smallholder grower is 
not adequately equipped to deal with a prolonged slump. Most small farms rely on 
coffee as the only crop. According to the survey of coffee growers in Karnataka, 
income from farming constitutes 92% of all income on average among coffee growers 
with estate areas smaller than 20 acres, which is roughly half of all growers. On 
average, 79% of all farm income by coffee farms in Kartataka is derived from coffee. 




employment opportunities. Therefore losses from coffee farming induced by a 
collapse in prices can be expected to translate into cuts in consumption.  
Depressed and volatile prices have caused wide swings in coffee income in 
India, leading to substantial reduction in inputs and therefore lower production, which 
in turn affects the local economy of coffee growing districts. Unable to deal with the 
hardships of the crisis, some planters abandoned their estates in desperation (ICO 
2002, Oxfam 2005), and there have been reports of indebted farmers committing 
suicide11.  
4.3.2 Strategies for managing income risks 
 Although the prices have partially recovered since 2003, coffee growers 
remain vulnerable to price fluctuations as well as other risks. Risk management 
instruments at their disposal are very limited. Risk reduction strategies at the farm 
level (self-insurance) include inter-cropping, in particular with pepper, which grows 
around shade trees, diversification of income-generating activities (off-farm 
employment) and the use of credit, either formal or informal, to help smooth 
consumption over time. Risk pooling through cooperatives or other organizations is 
also common. Collective management of saved resources at the community level can 
help deal with small risks, as long as these risks are not correlated across members so 
that all incur losses at the same time. Apart from risk mitigation through farming 
decisions and risk pooling, there are practically no other ways to reduce income 
uncertainty. Typical risk sharing activities that include the use of marketing and 
production contracts, vertical integration, hedging on international commodity futures 
                                                 
11 According to The Hindu newspaper (2007), between 2001 and 2007 150 coffee growers committed 




and options markets and insurance are not available to Indian coffee growers. 
Virtually all trade is done on the spot, and marketing contracts are not common. 
According to a report by the International Task Force on Commodity Risk 
Management (CRMG, 2003), however, some exporters do offer price-fixation 
schemes based on London and New York futures markets to larger planters and 
commercial estates. In addition, the government applies measures to protect growers 
from price uncertainty. Thus, during the coffee price crisis the government 
restructured terms of loans to growers, subsidized interest paid by small growers and 
provided export incentives.  
Commodity options trading is not allowed in domestic markets in India, and 
overseas trading in options is strictly regulated, requiring clearance from the 
government. The Coffee Board of India attempted to set up a pilot risk management 
scheme based on an exchange-traded put options contract in order to provide 
producers with access to international markets for price hedging. The pilot scheme, 
which essentially would have worked as price insurance, was implemented with the 
technical support from the World Bank and participation of local banks as distributors 
of the insurance, but ultimately was not successful. Apart from bureaucratic 
complications, the primary reason for failure was insufficient interest among the 
growers. A survey sponsored by the World Bank was conducted in March 2003 to 
assess producer demand for price insurance and acceptable premiums. The growers 
were asked whether they would be interested in participating in such a scheme, and 
while the majority replied that they would at least consider it, the subsequent 




actuarially fair premium. Therefore it is unlikely that the scheme would have been 
financially viable.  
 Weather-related yield volatility continues to be the single most important risk 
to producers. Therefore, in March 2007 the Agricultural Insurance Company of India 
jointly with the Coffee Board launched a rainfall insurance program to reduce 
rainfall-induced coffee yield risks. The risks covered are lack of rains during 
“Blossom” and “Backing”periods (from March 1 to April 15 every year in case of 
Robusta and from March 1 to April 30 in case of Arabica), as well as excess rains 
during the Monsoon period (from July 1 to August 31). The Indian Coffee Board 
offered a 50% subsidy to the small growers to cover insurance premiums. The 
premium amount varies from zone to zone, based of the 30-year historical rainfall 
data across 43 different coffee zones. The insurance claims will be automated based 
on actual rainfall data. This type of weather-indexed insurance does not suffer from 
the usual moral hazard problem and has lower administrative costs than traditional 
crop insurance. It is therefore better suited to small farmers who depend on rainfall. 
The scheme is intended to cover about 85,000 growers in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and 
Kerala. The extent of participation in this scheme will become apparent after 
December 2007, when insurance for 2008 will become available. 
4.4 Methodology 
 This chapter develops a methodology for assessing producers’ risk 
preferences based on subjective price expectations and reported maximum premiums 
for price insurance. Rather than estimating the risk aversion parameter explicitly, this 




information on changes in risk premiums in response to a shift in price distribution 
caused by insurance. A number of tests are then performed to conclude whether risk 
averse farmers differ in their assessments and decisions from other producers.  
 As it is typical for coffee plantations, planting decisions are assumed to be 
made years in advance, and effort at harvesting is determined by the planted area and 
yield, which is stochastic. Both price p and output q are stochastic, and growers 
maximize their expected utility under income uncertainty. Utility depends on income 
Y=pq and effort at harvesting l(q) and the farmer maximizes expected 
utility ))(()( qwlYEUEU −=π . Price insurance is offered to producers in the 
beginning of a crop year. With price insurance, the producer is guaranteed a certain 
price p~  if the market price at the time of sale is below p~ . The insurance has a 
premium of x rupees per bag of insured coffee. It is assumed that effort at harvesting 
is not affected by whether or not price insurance is purchased. The farmer chooses 
quantity q~ to insure. Assume that this quantity has an upper bound at total production, 
qq <~ . The income under insurance is 
( ) ( )q p x q q p if p p
Y
qp qx if p p
qp qx qZ
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where Z p p= −%  if pp ~<  and Z = 0 otherwise. The mean and variance of income 
under insurance are 
))((~)()
~








 A producer buys price insurance if it makes her better off than not doing so. 
Therefore, the break even insurance premium x* at which the farmer is indifferent 
between purchasing the insurance and not doing it is determined by:  
( ) ( ))()(~~ * qwlqpEUqwlZqxqqpEU −=−+−     (4.4) 
This implies that the certainty equivalent of income should be the same with 
and without insurance: 
( ) ( ))()(~ qwlYCEqwlYCE −=−       (4.5) 





(         (4.6) 
where R
~
and R are risk premiums with and without insurance, respectively. Inserting 
E(Y)=E(pq) and (4.2) into (4.6) and rearranging we obtain the break even premium: 
)
~
()(~~ * RRZEqxq −+=        (4.7) 
 This expression shows that the break even insurance premium on price 
insurance equals the expected gain from the insurance that can be decomposed into 
the benefit from a change in expected income and the benefit from risk hedging. If a 
grower is risk neutral, she only cares about the expected income, setting 
)()
~
( YEYE = , and would therefore buy price insurance only if )(ZEx ≤ , that is, if 
insurance premium does not exceed the expected improvement in the mean income. 
If, on the other hand, the maximum premium the grower is willing to pay exceeds 
E(Z), it is because she is willing to pay 0
~
>− RR  for a reduction of the income 




 Limiting the analysis to two parameter distributions that depend only on the 








. This holds for the typical set-ups with a CARA or CRRA utility 
function and normal or lognormal prices. In this setting )()
~
( YVarYVar <  
implies RR <
~
. In terms of the mean-variance trade-off it implies that a risk averse 
grower would be willing to trade some of the expected income for a reduction in 
variance. Appendix 4.A shows that in the setting described above, the variance of 
income declines when the grower buys price insurance. Since participation in 
insurance reduces income volatility it follows from (4.7) that a risk averse grower 
would be willing to pay an insurance premium x* that exceeds E(Z). 
 The expected value and variance of Z are 
( ))(~)( TpEpZE −Φ= and       (4.8) 
)()( 2 TpVarZVar Φ= ,        (4.9) 
where )~|()( pppEpE T <= and )
~|()( pppVarpVar T <=  are the mean and 
variance of the price truncated from above at the insured price p~  and )~Pr( pp <=Φ .  
The empirical approach in this Chapter is as follows. First, E(Z) is evaluated 
analytically for each grower using (4.8) and information on growers’ perceptions of 
the price distribution. This is done under assumptions of normal and log normal 
prices. When price is assumed to be normally distributed with parameters pµ  and 
2
pσ , 
a formula for the mean of a normal distribution truncated from above is applied to 
calculate E(pTi) for grower i: 

























−= , )( iαϕ  is the standard normal density 
and )( iαΦ  is the cumulative standard normal distribution (Greene, Theorem 20.2). 
The moments of the price distribution are obtained from the information on farmers’ 
expectations regarding future market prices from a survey presented in the next 
section. Coffee growers are asked what they perceive as the “most likely” level of 
prices in 5 months. The response is used as the expected price piµ . The survey also 
contains questions on the highest and the lowest price that the growers expect. To 



















)Pr(      (4.11) 
and two different assumptions: 95.0)Pr( =< highii pp and 
.99.0)Pr( =< highii pp  
Under assumption of log normal price distribution with )(lnln pEp =µ and 
)(ln2ln pVarp =σ , E(pTi) is calculated as follows. I apply a formula for the mean of a 
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where pipioi pU lnln /)
~(ln σµ−= . 
Then, )~|()( pppEpE iiTi <=  can be found from:  




 The moments of lognormal distribution for each grower i are calculated by 
solving the system of two equations for pilnµ and 
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µµ +=        (4.15) 
where )( ipi pE=µ  is the expected price reported by grower i. The second equation 
follows from the expectations of a log-normal distribution. Again, two different 
assumptions are made on the perceived probability of price falling below the reported 
high price: 95.0)Pr( =< highii pp and .99.0)Pr( =<
high
ii pp  
 After evaluating E(Z), the responses of growers regarding the maximum 
premium that they would agree to pay to participate in a price insurance scheme (x*) 
are compared to E(Z), and growers are classified as either risk averse or risk 









       
Note that while the last condition implies either risk neutrality or risk loving 
behavior, the latter is not supported by empirical and experimental evidence on 
farmers’ attitudes toward risk in developing countries. Finally, a number of tests are 
performed to assess whether risk averse growers differ from other growers in their 
farm management and consumption smoothing decisions. 
 Note that while it may be tempting to try to calculate the risk aversion 




requires imposition of constraints on the form of the utility function, which implies 
restrictions on the structure of risk preferences that one tries to estimate (Just and 
Just, 2007). Moreover, the problem outlined above does not easily simplify to a 
standard certainty equivalent representation based on CRRA utility and lognormal 
income (or CARA utility and normally distributed income). Even if pq follows a 
lognormal or normal distribution, Y
~
in (4.1) does not, since the price is truncated 
at p~ . Therefore, the approach taken in this paper is to evaluate attitude towards risk 
by analyzing the behavior of the risk premium in response to a monotonic shrinking 
of the price distribution, but without estimating the risk aversion parameter explicitly.  
 An important caveat applies with respect to the methodology outlined above. 
To infer the variance of price from the survey data it was necessary to impose 
restrictions on the farmers’ interpretation of the question regarding “highest likely” 
price. Clearly, the probability that growers assign to the price falling below the high 
price has direct implications for the calculated variance, as demonstrated in (4.11), 
(4.14) and (4.15). The proportion of growers being classified as risk averse hinges 
critically on this assumption. Section 4.6 discusses the results with this caveat in mind 
and shows how the change in the assumption on perceived probabilities affects the 
outcome. In the following probability levels 95% and 99% are chosen as the most 
plausible in terms of interpretation of the survey question, albeit somewhat arbitrary. 
Another point to bear in mind is that the approach outlined above relies on the 





 The data used for this exercise stem from the same survey of Karnataka coffee 
growers which provided the data for the analysis in the previous chapter. The survey 
was conducted in March 2003 as part of analytical work in preparations for a pilot 
insurance scheme. The idea was to offer growers an insurance scheme based on put 
options, priced against London and/or New York futures. The Canara Bank in India 
and the Coffee Board jointly approached the World Bank for assistance in setting a 
risk management program for producers. 
 Five hundred growers were interviewed during survey data collection. 
Summary statistics on some grower and farm characteristics are presented in Table 
4.1. Coffee producers are 96% male and the average age is 54. Almost half of 
growers have university education, which is high, given that the enrollment rate for 
university education in India is approximately 10% on aggregate. Approximately half 
of all coffee producers are members of a cooperative and/or a grower organization. 
The average area of a coffee plantation is 52 acres, but dispersion is very high with 
some very large estates and a large number with smaller farms, with a median of the 
sample at 20 acres. There is also great variability in output. Most producers grow 
Arabica coffee, but on average produce smaller quantities than Robusta growers. 
Median output falls short of the mean in all cases, given a large number of small 
producers in Karnataka.  There is also some variation in prices across producers, as 
discussed in more detail in the previous chapter. On average, unwashed (dry-
processed) coffee brings in less than half of the price of washed (wet-processed) 




of the product, since in washed coffee the pulp is removed before it is sold to traders. 
The average revenue from coffee was 617 thousands Rs. (US$12,680) and the total 
farm income was 762 thousands Rs. (US$15,670), while 5% of all farms had a 
revenue of over 3 million Rs. (US$63,600). The average cultivation cost is 17 
thousand Rs. per acre for Arabica and 12 thousand Rs. for Robusta.   
 The survey questionnaire contains a separate part intended to assess growers’ 
ability to pay for coffee price insurance. First, producers are asked whether they 
would consider insuring a minimum price for the next three or six months. Next, for 
each of the three types of coffee (wet-processed Arabica, dry-processed Arabica and 
dry-processed Robusta), producers are asked whether they would be willing to pay a 
certain premium per bag of coffee for a certain guaranteed price. If the answer is yes, 
the premium is increased, and if the answer is no, the amount is decreased, and the 
respondents are asked again whether they would participate. After these two 
questions are answered, the growers are asked about the maximum premium they 
would be willing to pay to insure coffee at a given guarantee price. The response to 
this last question is used in the analysis as x* to establish risk preferences of growers, 
using (4.7). Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics for reported price expectations. 
The median expected price for both unwashed Arabica and unwashed Robusta is 900 
Rs. per bag of coffee. The median expected price is 1,725 Rs. for washed Robusta 
and 2,255 for washed Arabica.    
 Table 4.2 summarizes the responses on insurance premiums that growers 
would be willing to pay to enroll in each of the six suggested price insurance 




the type of coffee and the level of protection offered. Higher guaranteed price induces 
higher participation rate with positive insurance premiums. For example, when 2500 
Rs. in insured price for washed Arabica are offered, 93% of farmers reply that they 
would participate and pay a premium. It is interesting to note, however, that when the 
insured price is raised to 2800 Rs., the rate of participation drops to 81%. The only 
reasonable explanation for this inconsistency is that growers either do not understand 
how the insurance scheme works or do not trust that they would receive a price that 
high. The participation rate is lowest for a guaranteed price of 800 Rs. for unwashed 
Robusta and Arabica (51% and 37%, respectively). Overall, across the six schemes 
offered, 68% of growers reported positive acceptable premiums, which is rather low. 
This is somewhat puzzling, given that the guaranteed prices offered are substantially 
higher than the expected prices, averaged over all growers, in all cases, except when 
800 Rs. was offered as the insured price for unwashed Arabica and Robusta.   
4.6 Empirical results 
 This section utilizes survey responses of unwashed Robusta and Arabica 
coffee growers on the maximum premiums they would be willing to pay for a price 
insurance with a price guarantee of 800 Rs. The reason for limiting the analysis to this 
scheme is that it offers an intuitively appealing trade-off between expected income 
and income variability: most farmers expect the price to be higher than 800 Rs. in the 
future, and the experiment is therefore to see if they would trade some of the expected 
mean for greater certainty. When growers are offered a 1000 Rs. minimum price, on 
the other hand, speculative considerations could overshadow the benefits of risk 




average expected price is 905 Rs. for unwashed Arabica and 946 Rs. for unwashed 
Robusta).  
 Tables 4.3 through 4.5 report findings based on the assumption of log normal 
prices and the probability of prices falling below high prices being 95%. Descriptive 
statistics for the calculated break even insurance premium under risk neutrality x*= 
E(Z) are presented in Table 4.3. Note that under risk neutrality the average premium 
that growers would be willing to pay for price insurance is around 18-19 Rs. per bag 
of coffee, depending on the type traded. However, there are many zero responses, and 
the medians are only 3 Rs. and 1 Rs. for Robusta and Arabica, respectively. The 
correspondence between price expectations and break even premiums under risk 
neutrality is shown in Table 4.4. It demonstrates how E(Z) decreases with price 
expectations, so that higher price expectations result in lower break even premiums. 
 Table 4.5 compares the calculated premiums under risk neutrality with the 
positive acceptable premiums reported by the growers in the survey. The average 
calculated premiums under risk neutrality of those who reported greater than zero but 
lower than 25 Rs. as the maximum premium they would be willing to pay fall within 
that range for both Robusta and Arabica growers (the means are 20.2 and 20.1, 
respectively). However, the average E(Z) fall below the lower bound in the next three 
ranges, indicating that at least some growers are willing to pay higher premiums than 
what can be predicted with risk neutral behavior.   
Table 4.6 reports the shares of risk averse and non risk averse farmers 
according to the established criteria for risk aversion (x*> E(Z)), under different 




approximately one third of growers can be characterized as risk averse. The share is 
highest when log normal prices are assumed and a thinner tail (Pr(p<phigh) = 0.99): 
38.5% of all growers are classified as risk averse12.  
 The next step is to examine empirically the relationship between attitudes 
toward risk and farm characteristics as well as farm decisions that could be 
considered a form of self-insurance. In the following analysis Robusta and Arabica 
growers are pooled together. Two simple tests are used to test hypotheses on the 
interaction between risk aversion and other variables. In the case of dichotomous 
variables I use Pearson's chi-square test of independence. For continuous variables a 
t-test of the equality of means is performed to establish whether the means of the 
variables in question differ for risk averse and non risk averse growers. Equality of 
variances in the two groups is tested in each case using an F-test. If equality cannot be 
rejected, the t-test assumes that the variance is the same in the two groups. Otherwise, 
this assumption is relaxed. 
 Tables 4.7 through 4.10 contain the results of this exercise under different 
assumptions. First, Table 4.7 demonstrates that while risk averse growers appear to 
have smaller farms than other growers and produce less on average, the differences 
between the two groups are not statistically significant. Thus, owners of small and 
large farms are equally risk averse. Next, the relationship between income 
                                                 
12 As discussed in Section 4.4, the calculated share of risk averse farmers is directly dependent on the 
perceived price distribution. It follows from Table 4.6 that the share is higher at lower Pr(p<phigh): In 
the two cases studied, the share of risk averse growers is highest when the probability is assumed to be 
99% rather than 95%. Assuming Pr(p<phigh) = 0.75 decreases the share even further: only 14.9% (if  
log-normal prices are assumed) and 13.7% (in the case of normal prices) would be classified as risk 
averse. These results follow from the fact that fatter tail on the price distribution implies lower E(pT) in 
(4.8), and therefore stronger incentive to participate in price insurance for risk neutral agents. The 
reported high maximum premiums for price insurance would in this case reflect higher expected payoff 




diversification and risk aversion is analyzed (Table 4.8). Crop diversification, 
commonly considered an important instrument of risk reduction, does not seem to 
vary with attitudes to risk.13 There is no evidence that risk averse farmers differ from 
other farmers in their decision to diversify or concentrate their crop portfolio. In 
addition, risk averse farmers do not tend to have a greater share of off-farm income, 
as one may expect. 
 Table 4.9 considers actions taken to self insure and to smooth consumption.  
In three out of four settings considered, risk averse farmers are found to be less likely 
to carry over stocks of coffee. As the table shows, less than 3% of risk averse growers 
carry over stocks, compared to approximately 7% of other farmers, and the difference 
is significant at the 10% level in all cases except III. This is fully consistent with the 
expectation that risk averse farmers would try to sell as much output as possible 
following harvest, to avoid bearing the risk of a price change in the next season. 
Under assumptions in case I, risk averse farmers also tend to be better informed about 
the current levels of grower prices: 98% replied that they knew what the price was, 
relative to 95% of other growers. The difference is significant at 10% in case I, but 
not in other cases. Another variable of interest is membership in cooperative. In three 
out four scenarios the share of risk averse farmers that are members of a cooperative 
is higher than of other farmers (approximately 60% versus 50%) and the difference is 
significant. This is an indication of the importance of cooperatives for risk sharing at 
                                                 







γ , where γj is 
the proportion of revenue from growing crop j. The following crops are included, besides coffee: 




the local level. The relationship between risk aversion and credit is examined by 
looking at proportion of growers with an account in a financial institution. The table 
shows that in two out of four cases the difference in share between risk averse 
growers and other growers and positive and significant. 
 Table 4.10 presents the evidence on dealing with decline in income under risk 
aversion. All farmers report reduction in non-essential expenditure and difficulty 
paying debt as the two most important strategies for dealing with income decline. 
73% on average name expenditure reduction as important or very important and 64% 
of all growers have difficulty repaying debt according to the same criteria. 
Interestingly, risk averse farmers are less likely to reduce expenditure, but are more 
likely to have trouble repaying debts than non risk averse farmers, at least in case II, 
where both differences are found to be significant at the 10% level. This supports 
previous findings that farm incomes and rural credit are interlinked in a way that 
induces risk sharing. Both groups seek financial help from family members during 
hardships, but there is no significant different across risk averse and other growers. 
  Finally, Table 4.11 compares prices received by risk averse and non 
risk averse growers. The intuition is that risk averse growers would be inclined to 
trade some of the expected price for certainty and would therefore either sell early on 
in the season, instead of waiting for better prices by holding stocks or sell coffee to 
traders at unfavorable terms to avoid the risk of lower prices from other traders. This 
reasoning is supported by evidence only in the case of unwashed Robusta (the most 




assumption, risk averse Robusta growers received between 3.3% and 3.9% lower 
price per 50 kg of unwashed coffee than other growers. 
4.7 Willingness to pay for price insurance and education 
This paper assumes that low participation rates and low willingness to pay for 
price insurance are driven by lack of risk aversion. However, lack of interest in 
insurance could potentially be attributed to lack of familiarity of the growers with 
price insurance instruments, their design, costs and benefits. In addition, the survey 
was done during a severe price crisis, and the responses may have been affected by 
lack of liquidity as the farmers were experiencing losses from growing coffee. These 
are the reasons typically highlighted in the literature. In a survey on participation in a 
rainfall insurance in rural India (Giné et. al., 2007) most farmers named not 
understanding the project and cash or credit constraints as the main reasons for not 
buying the insurance. Similarly, the comprehensive case studies in the book by 
Claessens and Duncan (1993) concluded that lack of awareness of risks and lack of 
understanding of market instruments were the principal reasons for underutilization of 
price management tools in developing countries. 
To assess whether understanding of how the insurance scheme works has an 
important effect on participation in insurance, the relationship between education 
level of growers and their reported willingness to pay is explored, and the results are 
presented in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. The hypothesis is that education level and the 
degree of comprehension with regard to insurance are closely correlated. Table 4.12 




categories, the average is slightly higher among the growers with secondary 
education, and not among those with university education, as one may expect.  
Table 4.13 reports the results of OLS regressions for unwashed Arabica and 
Robusta coffees, where the dependent variable is the reported maximum premium 
that growers are willing to pay to insure, and the independent variables are mean and 
variance of price and education. The hypothesis is that those with higher education 
would be more interested in price insurance, since they have a better understanding of 
the benefits it offers. In addition the regression tests whether producers with lowest 
price expectations and highest subjective price variance are most interested in price 
insurance, since that would be the prediction of the model with a two-moment price 
distribution. The implicit assumption is that all growers have the same degree of risk 
aversion. The results show that the moments of price distribution and education level 
are poor predictors of willingness to pay for price insurance, when risk aversion is 
omitted. All coefficients have the expected signs, but none are significant. In addition, 
the model fit is poor, with very low R-squared. This could indicate that growers differ 
in their attitude to risk, and that the level of comprehension of the instruments and 
price expectations are not the only determinants of participation in insurance.     
4.8 Conclusions 
 This chapter developed a framework for assessing farmers’ risk preferences 
using their responses regarding participation in price insurance and maximum 
acceptable insurance premiums. The data from a survey on Karnataka coffee growers 
are used to separate risk averse producers from other producers and to test empirically 




 Approximately one third of all coffee growers in the sample can be classified 
as risk averse. No relationship was found between risk aversion and farm size.  
Although risk averse farmers are not more likely than other growers to make efforts 
to diversify income, these growers were found to be more prone to taking other 
actions to reduce income risk and smooth consumption. Thus, risk averse farmers are 
less likely to hold stocks, which makes intuitive sense, because carrying stocks 
involves assuming the risk of changing prices. The same argument holds for the 
finding that in the case of unwashed Robusta, the most common type of coffee bought 
from farms in India, risk averse growers receive lower prices than other growers 
when lognormal prices are assumed, presumably because they trade some of the price 
for avoiding the price uncertainty. If risk averse farmers were better informed about 
local prices, it could provide further evidence that risk averse agents are more likely 
to take steps to reduce income uncertainty. However, the difference in awareness was 
only found to be significant in one out of four cases. Risk averse growers are more 
likely to smooth consumption at the time of income decline by having an account 
with a financial institution. Interestingly, these farmers also find it more difficult to 
repay loans when their incomes fall to avoid reducing expenditure, which is 
consistent with the literature on risk-sharing in the rural credit markets.  
The responses of Karnataka coffee growers support earlier findings that 
demand for price risk management instruments in developing countries is rather 
weak. Only 68% of growers are willing to pay anything at all to hedge coffee price 
and most would only accept low premiums. This paper attributes the differences in 




and shows that education level alone cannot explain why producers differ in their 















 Source: Coffee Board of India 
 



























































































World price Robusta: Combined spot prices of “Robusta” coffee traded daily in the New York 
and Le Havre/Marseilles markets (weights: 25% New York, 75% Le Havre/Marseilles) 
World price Arabica: Combined spot prices of “Other Mild” coffee traded daily in the New 
York and Hamburg markets (weights: 40% New York; 60% Hamburg) 
Producer prices: Average farm-gate prices for all grades, reported by the Indian Coffee Board 
to ICO.  





Figure 4.4 Coefficient of variation of domestic coffee prices  































































































Average farm-gate prices for all grades, reported by the Indian Coffee Board to ICO.  




Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 494 54.5 12.4 25 94
Gender (1=male) 500 0.95 0.22 0 1
Primary education 500 0.08 0.27 0 1
Secondary education 500 0.43 0.50 0 1
University education 500 0.47 0.50 0 1
Member of cooperative 500 0.51 0.50 0 1
Member of grower association 500 0.48 0.50 0 1
Member of another organization 500 0.16 0.37 0 1
Area of estate, acres 500 51.8 20.0 96.7 2 890
Planted area, acres 500 48.0 17.0 90.3 1 884
Yielding area, acres 500 46.7 16.0 85.3 1 750
Output, unwashed Arabica, 50 kg bags 225 88 36 208 2 2,600
Output, washed Arabica, 50 kg bags 222 328 118 619 3 6,092
Output, unwashed Robusta, 50 kg bags 187 362 221 390 4 2,100
Output, washed Robusta, 50 kg bags 52 713 320 1185 3 6,933
Sale price, unwashed Arabica, 50 kg bags 233 815 800 94 250 1,200
Sale price, washed Arabica, 50 kg bags 221 1,927 1900 191 1200 2,600
Sale price, unwashed Robusta, 50 kg bags 188 574 600 83 400 850
Sale price, washed Robusta, 50 kg bags 44 1,231 1200 218 700 1,800
Coffee revenue, 1000 Rs. 374 617 230 1,274 4 11,900
Total farm revenue, 1000 Rs. 379 762 263 1,860 1 25,800
Cost of cultivation of Arabica, 1000 Rs/acre 229 17.0 17.0 3.7 5.0 25.5
Cost of cultivation of Robusta, 1000 Rs/acre 192 11.7 12.0 3.3 1.0 22.0
Share of farm income in total income, % 380 91.4 19.6 25 100
Share of coffee in farm income 379 79.2 15.5 25 100
Expected price washed Arabica 242 2,255 2,300 337.1 200 3,000
Expected price unwashed Arabica 240 905 900 119.4 350 1,500
Expected price washed Robusta 58 1,745 1,725 178.0 1,100 2,200






Table 4.2 Accepted premiums for price insurance 
Robusta (unwashed)
Guaranteed price of 800 Rs. per bag Guaranteed price of 1000 Rs. per bag
Premium range Freq. Percent Cum. Premium range Freq. Percent Cum.
0 121 48.8 48.8 0 35 14.1 14.1
0-25 52 21.0 69.8 0-25 19 7.7 21.8
25-50 55 22.2 91.9 25-50 109 44.0 65.7
50-75 13 5.2 97.2 50-100 78 31.5 97.2
>75 7 2.8 100.0 >100 7 2.8 100.0
Share of wtp>0 51.2% Share of wtp>0 85.9%
Total 248 100 Total 248 100
Arabica (unwashed)
Guaranteed price of 800 Rs. per bag Guaranteed price of 1000 Rs. per bag
Premium range Freq. Percent Cum. Premium range Freq. Percent Cum.
0 194 63.2 63.2 0 113 36.8 36.8
0-25 31 10.1 73.3 0-25 16 5.2 42.0
25-50 68 22.2 95.4 25-50 105 34.2 76.2
50-75 8 2.6 98.1 50-100 67 21.8 98.1
>75 6 2.0 100.0 >100 6 2.0 100.0
Share of wtp>0 36.8% Share of wtp>0 63.2%
Total 307 100 Total 307 100
Arabica (washed)
Guaranteed price of 2500 Rs. per bag Guaranteed price of 2800 Rs. per bag
Premium range Freq. Percent Cum. Premium range Freq. Percent Cum.
0 21 7.0 7.0 0 56 19 18.6
0-50 25 8.3 15.3 0-100 49 16 34.9
50-100 150 49.8 65.1 100-200 137 46 80.4
100-200 100 33.2 98.3 200-300 46 15 95.7
>200 5 1.7 100.0 >300 13 4.3 100.0
Share of wtp>0 93.0% Share of wtp>0 81.4%




Table 4.3 Break even insurance premiums under risk neutrality, E(Z)  
Summary statistics 
Robusta Arabica Percentiles Robusta Arabica
Obs 190 234 1% 0.0000 0.0000
Mean 19.14 17.98 5% 0.0002 0.0000
Std. Dev. 29.36 47.33 10% 0.001 0.014
Variance 862.15 2240.48 25% 0.79 0.79
Skewness 2.82 6.82 50% 3.24 1.01





Calculated using ( ))~|(~)( pppEpZE <−Φ=  
Price is assumed to be log normally distributed and Pr(p<phigh) = 0.95. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Price expectations and E(Z) 
 
  Robusta   Arabica 
    Expected price E(Z)     Expected 
price 
E(Z) 
Expected price Obs Mean St.D. Mean St.D.   Obs Mean St.D. Mean St.D. 
             
<700 0       3 517 152.8 318.2 191.9 
700-800 15 735 28.6 88.6 44.6   12 744 24.1 87.3 51.7 
800-900 72 822 26.3 25.9 20.4   87 832 28.1 19.6 24.3 
900-1000 58 912 22.1 5.0 8.6   81 906 17.2 4.5 11.9 
1000-1100 36 1000 0.0 4.2 8.6   33 1002 8.7 4.1 7.0 
>=1110 9 1183 50.0 0.0 0.0   18 1142 49.3 0.2 0.4 
             
Total 190 893 103.9 19.1 29.4   234 897 108.0 18.0 47.3 
                        
 




Table 4.5 Accepted premiums for price insurance and E(Z) 
Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Freq.
[0, 25] 20.2 21.4 42 20.1 37.9 26
[25, 50] 16.0 26.6 40 28.1 47.9 59
[50, 75] 22.5 30.8 11 12.0 22.4 6
>75 18.2 15.6 6 6.5 11.3 4
ArabicaRobusta
Calculated premium under risk neutrality, E(Z)
Range of premium
 
Price is assumed to be log normally distributed and Pr(p<phigh) = 0.95 
Only positive reported premiums are included 
 
Table 4.6 Share of risk averse farmers  
under different assumptions on price distribution 
 
Obs Share Obs Share Obs Share Obs Share
Not risk averse 237 64.9% 224 61.5% 251 68.6% 244 66.7%
Risk averse 128 35.1% 140 38.5% 115 31.4% 122 33.3%
Total 365 100.0% 364 100.0% 366 100.0% 366 100.0%















Table 4.7 Risk aversion and farm size 
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t
Area of the estate, acres
Not risk averse 49.3 6.2 95.0 49.0 6.4 96.2 50.0 6.0 94.9 50.5 6.2 96.2
Risk averse 42.6 7.1 80.7 43.7 6.8 80.4 40.0 7.3 78.5 39.4 6.9 76.4
combined 46.9 4.7 90.2 47.0 4.7 90.3 46.8 4.7 90.1 46.8 4.7 90.1
diff 6.7 9.4 0.71 5.3 9.3 0.57 10.0 9.5 1.06 11.1 9.3 1.20
Total production
Not risk averse 532.6 58.2 895.8 495.2 53.6 801.6 525.6 55.4 877.2 530.5 56.9 888.3
Risk averse 461.7 81.5 922.2 528.4 89.1 1053.9 465.3 89.6 960.9 459.1 84.7 935.0
combined 507.7 47.3 904.5 508.0 47.5 905.7 506.7 47.2 903.5 506.7 47.2 903.5
diff 70.9 99.3 0.71 -33.1 103.9 -0.32 60.3 101.8 0.59 71.4 100.2 0.71
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%














Table 4.8 Risk aversion and income diversification 
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t
Crop diversification, Herfindahl index
Not risk averse 0.835 0.01 0.2 0.832 0.01 0.2 0.834 0.01 0.2 0.834 0.01 0.2
Risk averse 0.832 0.02 0.2 0.836 0.02 0.2 0.835 0.02 0.2 0.835 0.02 0.2
combined 0.834 0.01 0.2 0.833 0.01 0.2 0.834 0.01 0.2 0.834 0.01 0.2
diff 0.003 0.02 0.15 -0.005 0.02 -0.23 -0.001 0.02 -0.07 -0.001 0.02 -0.03
Share of off-farm income, %
Not risk averse 8.65 1.28 19.6 8.71 1.34 20.0 8.76 1.25 19.8 9.02 1.28 20.0
Risk averse 9.57 1.82 20.6 9.46 1.69 20.0 9.35 1.89 20.3 8.81 1.79 19.8
combined 8.97 1.04 20.0 9.00 1.05 20.0 8.95 1.04 19.9 8.95 1.04 19.9
diff -0.48 2.08 -0.42 -0.76 2.16 -0.35 -0.58 2.25 0.26 0.20 2.21 0.09
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




























Not risk averse 220 17 237 208 16 224 234 17 251 2.27 17 244
92.8% 7.2% 100% 92.9% 7.1% 100% 93.2% 6.8% 100% 93.0% 7.0% 100%
Risk averse 125 3 128 136 4 140 112 3 115 119 3 122
97.7% 2.3% 100% 97.1% 2.9% 100% 97.4% 2.6% 100% 97.5% 2.5% 100%
Total 345 20 365 3.743 * 344 20 364 3.047 * 346 20 366 2.647 346 20 366 3.200 *
94.5% 5.5% 100% 94.5% 5.5% 100% 94.5% 5.5% 100% 94.5% 5.5% 100%
Aware of local prices
Not risk averse 12 224 236 11 212 223 12 238 250 11 232 243
5.1% 94.9% 100% 4.9% 95.1% 100% 4.8% 95.2% 100% 4.5% 95.5% 100%
Risk averse 2 126 128 3 137 140 2 113 115 3 119 122
1.6% 98.4% 100% 2.1% 97.9% 100% 1.7% 98.3% 100% 2.5% 97.5% 100%
Total 14 350 364 2.784 * 14 349 363 1.805 14 351 365 2.000 14 351 365 0.942
3.9% 96.2% 100% 3.9% 96.1% 100% 3.8% 96.2% 100% 3.8% 96.2% 100%
Memership in a cooperative
Not risk averse 117 120 237 111 113 224 126 125 251 124 120 244
49.4% 50.6% 100% 49.6% 50.5% 100% 50.2% 49.8% 100% 50.8% 49.2% 100%
Risk averse 52 76 128 57 83 140 44 71 115 46 76 122
40.6% 59.4% 100% 40.7% 59.3% 100% 38.3% 61.7% 100% 37.7% 62.3% 100%
Total 169 196 365 2.555 168 196 364 2.709 * 170 196 366 4.519 ** 170 196 366 5.624 **
46.3% 53.7% 100% 46.2% 53.9% 100% 46.5% 53.6% 100% 46.5% 53.6% 100%
Account with financial institution
Not risk averse 16 221 237 16 208 224 17 234 251 17 227 244
6.8% 93.3% 100% 7.1% 92.9% 100% 6.8% 93.2% 100% 7.0% 93.0% 100%
Risk averse 4 124 128 4 136 140 3 112 115 3 119 122
31.3% 96.9% 100% 2.9% 97.1% 100% 2.6% 97.4% 100% 2.5% 97.5% 100%
Total 20 345 365 2.110 20 344 364 3.047 * 20 346 366 2.647 20 346 366 3.200 *
54.8% 94.5% 100% 5.5% 94.5% 100% 5.5% 94.5% 100% 5.5% 94.5% 100%
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%














Table 4.10 Risk aversion and ways of dealing with income decline 
Not 






















Not risk averse 8 49 180 237 8 44 172 224
3.4% 20.7% 76.0% 100% 3.6% 19.6% 76.8% 100%
Risk averse 4 38 86 128 4 43 93 140
3.1% 29.7% 67.2% 100% 2.9% 30.7% 66.4% 100%
Total 12 87 266 365 3.724 12 87 265 364 5.821 *
3.3% 23.8% 72.9% 100% 3.3% 23.9% 72.8% 100%
Have difficulty paying debts
Not risk averse 28 64 145 237 26 62 136 224
11.8% 27.0% 61.2% 100% 11.6% 27.7% 60.7% 100%
Risk averse 20 20 87 127 22 22 95 139
15.8% 15.8% 68.5% 100% 15.8% 15.8% 68.4% 100%
Total 48 84 232 364 6.206 ** 48 84 231 363 7.146 **
13.2% 23.1% 63.7% 100% 13.2% 23.1% 63.6% 100%
Seek financial help from family
Not risk averse 163 52 21 236 154 50 19 223
69.1% 22.0% 8.9% 100% 69.1% 22.4% 8.5% 100%
Risk averse 81 33 13 127 89 35 15 139
63.8% 26.0% 10.2% 100% 64.0% 25.2% 10.8% 100%
Total 244 85 34 363 1.052 243 85 34 362 1.070
67.2% 23.4% 9.4% 100% 67.1% 23.5% 9.4% 100%
Not 






















Not risk averse 9 52 190 251 9 50 185 244
3.6% 20.7% 75.7% 100% 3.7% 2.0% 75.8% 100%
Risk averse 3 36 76 115 3 38 81 122
2.6% 31.3% 66.1% 100% 2.5% 3.1% 66.4% 100%
Total 12 88 266 366 4.908 * 12 88 266 366 5.210 *
3.3% 24.0% 72.7% 100% 3.8% 2.4% 72.7% 100%
Have difficulty paying debts
Not risk averse 32 65 154 251 32 64 148 244
12.8% 25.9% 61.4% 100% 13.1% 26.2% 60.7% 100%
Risk averse 16 19 79 114 16 20 85 121
14.0% 16.7% 69.3% 100% 13.2% 16.5% 70.3% 100%
Total 48 84 233 365 3.775 48 84 233 365
13.2% 23.0% 63.8% 100% 13.2% 23.0% 63.8% 100% 4.474
Seek financial help from family
Not risk averse 173 55 22 250 168 54 21 243
69.2% 22.0% 8.8% 100% 69.1% 22.2% 8.6% 100%
Risk averse 71 31 12 114 76 32 13 121
62.3% 27.2% 10.5% 100% 62.8% 26.5% 10.7% 100%
Total 244 86 34 364 1.703 244 86 34 364 1.474
67.0% 23.6% 9.3% 100% 67.0% 23.6% 9.3% 100%














Table 4.11 Risk aversion and realized price 
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t
Washed Arabica
Not risk averse 1916 15.9 187.4 1920 16.0 185.9 1913 15.5 189.0 1914 15.8 190.5
Risk averse 1939 22.5 189.3 1929 22.4 192.3 1947 23.3 185.0 1942 22.5 182.6
combined 1924 13.0 187.9 1923 13.0 187.8 1923 12.9 188.1 1923 12.9 188.1
diff -23 27.4 -0.83 -9 27.2 -0.32 -35 28.3 -1.22 -28 27.9 -0.99
Unwashed Arabica
Not risk averse 818 7.9 96.6 820 8.0 96.8 817 7.5 95.1 819 7.6 95.4
Risk averse 805 10.6 89.8 800 10.3 89.5 805 11.5 92.2 802 11.1 91.2
combined 814 6.3 94.5 814 6.4 94.6 814 6.3 94.3 814 6.3 94.3
diff 13 13.5 1.00 20 13.4 1.48 * 12 14.0 0.89 16 13.8 1.18
Washed Robusta
Not risk averse 1214 42.4 228.4 1216 43.1 215.5 1216 39.7 221.2 1216 39.7 221.2
Risk averse 1275 69.6 220.2 1254 66.2 247.7 1281 87.6 247.8 1281 87.6 247.8
combined 1229 36.0 225.0 1229 36.0 225.0 1229 36.0 225.0 1229 36.0 225.0
diff -61 83.0 -0.74 -38 75.9 -0.50 -65 89.8 -0.73 -65 89.8 -0.73
Unwashed Robusta
Not risk averse 580 7.6 81.3 580 8.0 82.1 577 7.4 80.9 577 7.6 82.0
Risk averse 557 10.2 81.8 561 9.4 81.0 561 11.1 83.8 562 10.4 81.6
combined 572 6.1 82.0 572 6.1 82.0 572 6.1 82.0 572 6.1 82.0
diff 23 12.7 1.77 ** 19 12.4 1.54 * 16 13.1 1.24 15 12.9 1.15
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%














Table 4.12 Maximum acceptable premiums and education 
 
Education
Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Freq.
Primary 26.82 9.82 11 21.25 13.82 8
Secondary 30.33 16.05 51 24.71 15.61 45
University 28.80 29.25 46 24.35 16.28 57
Total 29.32 22.15 108 24.27 15.73 110
* At 800 Rs. guaranteed price
Max premium for                      
Unwashed Arabica





Table 4.13 Maximum acceptable premiums, price expectations and education 
Regression results 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Price mean 0.026 0.024 0.013 0.016
Price variance -4E-05 5E-05 -7E-05 9E-05
Dummy secondary education 3.847 7.929 3.492 6.866
Dummy university education 1.742 7.966 -1.025 6.789
Constant 3.896 22.264 12.752 16.013
No of observations 92 87
R-squared 0.026 0.034
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%





Appendix 4.A: Variance of income under price insurance 
 
To show that income variance is reduced by participation in price insurance, 
first note that total income under insurance can be decomposed into income generated 
by the insured quantity q~ and the remaining (uninsured) output qqq ~ˆ −= . Define Y
~
 
as income under insurance. It equals the sum of incomes from insured and uninsured 





−+=   (4.A.1) 
 Without a loss of generality, the total income without insurance can be written 
as the sum of incomes derived from sale of the same two quantities: 
)ˆ()~( qYqYY +=  (4.A.2) 
 In the following decomposition of variance is used to demonstrate that 
)()
~
( YVarYVar < . The variance decomposition rule can be used to show that the 
variance of income can be written as 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]pYEVarpYVarEYVar ||)( +=   (4.A.3) 
 This property is useful when dealing with censored data, such as in this case, 
where price is a censored variable under insurance: any price below p~ is replaced 
with p~ for insured output.  
 Without insurance the truncated moments of income are: 
( ) ( ) ( )ppqpEpppEqppYE ~|ˆ~|~~| <+<=<  (4.A.4) 
( ) ( ) ( )ppqpEpppEqppYE ~|ˆ~|~~| >+>=>  (4.A.5) 




( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ppqpqpCovppqpVarppqpVarppYVar ~|ˆ,~2~|ˆ~|~~| >+>+>=>  (4.A.7) 
and the untruncated mean of income is  
( ) ( ) ( )qpEpEqYE ˆ~ +=  (4.A.8) 
 With insurance the truncated moments of income are  
( ) ( ) xqppqpEqpppYE ~~|ˆ~~~|~ −<+=<  (4.A.9) 
( ) ( ) ( ) xqppqpEpppEqppYE ~~|ˆ~|~~|~ −>+>=>  (4.A.10) 
( ) ( )ppqpVarppYVar ~|ˆ~|~ <=<  (4.A.11) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ppqpqpCovppqpVarppqpVarppYVar ~|ˆ,~2~|ˆ~|~~|~ >+>+>=>  (4.A.12) 
and the untruncated mean of income is  
( ) ( ) ( ) xqqpEpppEqqpYE ~ˆ~|~)1(~~~ −+>Φ−+Φ=  (4.A.13) 
where )~Pr( pp <=Φ  
 Note that only the insured quantity q~ is affected by the purchase of insurance. 
The changes in moments of income in response to insurance purchase occur only 
through the effect of price censoring on q~ .When price falls below p~ , income from 
selling q~ becomes qp~~ . When pp ~< both the variance of income from q~ and the 
covariance between qp~~ and qp ˆ are zero.  The mean and variance of income generated 
by marketing of q̂ is the same with and without insurance. 
 Denote ( )[ ]pYVarE |~  and ( )[ ]pYVarE |  the means of conditional variances in 
(4.A.3), with and without insurance, respectively. As long as growers’ income is 













, ( ) ( )qppCovqqpqpCov ˆ,~ˆ,~ =  implies that the 




according to (4.A.6) and (4.A.11) it holds that ( ) ( )ppYVarppYVar ~|~|~ <<< . In 
addition, note that (4.A.7) and (4.A.12) imply that ( ) ( )ppYVarppYVar ~|~|~ >=>  
since enrollment in insurance does not change the variance of income conditional on 
price exceeding p~ . Therefore, the mean of variance under insurance is necessarily 
smaller than without insurance: ( )[ ] ( )[ ]pYVarEpYVarE ||~ < . 
 Next denote ( )[ ]pYEVar |~  and ( )[ ]pYEVar |  the variances of conditional 
means with and without insurance, respectively, as referenced in (4.A.3). These equal 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]22 ~|1~|)( YEppYEYEppYELVar −>Φ−+−<Φ=  (4.A.14) 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]22 ~~|~1~~|~)~( YEppYEYEppYELVar −>Φ−+−<Φ=  (4.A.15) 
 Inserting (4.A.4), (4.A.5) and (4.A.8) into (4.A.14) and (4.A.9), (4.A.10) and 
(4.A.13) into (4.A.15) and simplifying yields 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2ˆ~1| qEqEpYEVar ∆+∆Φ−Φ=  (4.A.16) 
and 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2ˆ~~1|~ qEqEpYEVar ∆+∆Φ−Φ=  (4.A.17) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )( )pppEpppEqqE ~|~|~~ <−>=∆ , ( ) ( )( )ppppEqqE ~~|~~~ −>=∆  and 
( ) ( ) ( )ppqpEppqpEqE ~|ˆ~|ˆˆ <−>=∆ . 
 Since ( )pppEp ~|~ <> , this implies that ( )[ ] ( )[ ]pYEVarpYEVar ||~ < . Given 
that both the mean of income variance and the variance of income mean in (4.A.3) are 





Chapter 5:  Concluding remarks 
5.1 Summary of results 
 This dissertation is intended to contribute to the ongoing debate on the future 
of coffee growing in developing countries by providing empirical evidence on the 
determinants of producer prices and farmers’ ability to deal with price risks. The three 
essays that comprise this dissertation focus on three different topics relevant to coffee 
growers’ welfare. Different methodology is used in each case to produce the 
evidence.   
 The main results of the cointegration analysis and error-correction model that 
use time series data for selected coffee producing countries are the following. First, 
the long-term cointegration between producer prices and international coffee prices 
improved following the structural reforms in most countries. Second, the reforms 
significantly increased the share of producer price in the world market price. Third, 
both short-term price transmission and speed of adjustment are significantly higher in 
the post-liberalization period. Fourth, producer prices adjust faster to changes in the 
world market price today than prior to the reforms, and the effect is stronger in 
countries where reforms were far-reaching. Fifth, asymmetric price transmission is 
detected in some cases, taking the form that price increases are transmitted slower 
than price declines.  
 The general finding on the relationship between market structure and producer 
prices, based on cross-section data from India, is that competition in marketing 
matters in some, but not all cases. The first conclusion is that lack of competition 




homogeneous of the two types of coffee produced in India, but not on Arabica prices. 
Second, fewer traders operate in remote areas, and therefore farms that are located far 
from town can not easily switch buyers. Third, marketing arrangements have less 
implications for Arabica prices than the altitude at which the coffee is grown: Better 
quality coffee is grown at higher altitude and fetches higher premium. Fourth, 
university-educated growers receive higher prices. Fifth, marketing channels affect 
producer prices differently depending on the type of coffee: Robusta growers receive 
higher prices if they sell directly to exporter; for Arabica growers all outlets are 
equivalent, unless they sell to coffee curers, which pay significantly less than other 
buyers. Lastly, producers of washed Robusta receive much higher prices, if they are 
members of a cooperative 
 The main result of the last essay that investigates the relationship between risk 
aversion and risk mitigation strategies is that risk averse farmers do use informal 
strategies to reduce uncertainty. In particular, risk averse farmers are more likely to 
join cooperatives and less likely to hold stock. In addition, I find that risk averse 
growers are more likely to default on their loans than other farmers and less likely to 
reduce expenditure, which is consistent with the consumption smoothing objective. 
These findings are also consistent with the usual findings in the literature on risk 
sharing. On the other hand, risk averse farmers do not make greater use of income 
diversification through crop mix or off-farm employment, contrary to the intuition. 
Finally, I find that, under certain assumptions, Robusta growers receive lower prices 




5.2 Policy implications 
 The policy implications of this research are rather intuitive. The results of this 
dissertation indicate that the structural reforms in the coffee sector overall were 
successful in achieving the goals that they pursued. Whether or not they left 
producers better off, is a different matter. Clearly, a more dynamic response of 
domestic prices to changes in international markets benefits producers when the 
world prices are on a rise and hurts them when prices are falling. As coffee growers 
are almost certainly risk averse, this implies that any initiatives promoting producer 
welfare need to include price risk management. This explains why formal markets for 
risks are on the rise in coffee producing countries.  
 The role of state in this context is being redefined. Rather than being involved 
directly in market functioning, the successors to coffee boards are now focusing on 
providing services that would expand the reach of these markets and ease the access 
of farmers to the risk management products, in particular for the poorer and less 
informed segments of growers. The principal challenge is to facilitate the use of 
markets (domestic and international) to achieve the same objectives as stabilization 
programs set out, but in an efficient and sustainable fashion. Thus, the role of the 
coffee authorities today should be providing extension services and technical 
assistance to farmers, and to promote market-based risk management instruments. 
This requires identification and education of viable producer organizations or local 
institutions that would be able to disseminate risk-management instruments. 
 The results of this dissertation also indicate that farm risks and rural credit are 




in particular if they are risk averse. This lends empirical support to appropriateness of 
the proposed pilot programs that link price insurance to rural financing. The approach 
tested in these pilots is conditioning rural credit on purchase of price insurance. 
Another result is that cooperatives have an important role to play, both for risk 
pooling, exploiting economies of scale in marketing and collective bargaining to 
achieve higher prices. 
 Finally, since competition among traders matters for producer prices, policy-
makers should encourage competition and remove the remaining barriers to entry into 
the marketing sector. Dissolution of marketing boards does not automatically mean 
that the marketing sector becomes perfectly competitive. In the recent years the 
tendency in commodity markets has been towards concentration and collusion in 
marketing. Laws promoting competition in farm product markets, which either do not 
exist or are not properly enforced in many developing countries, should be 
strengthened.  
5.3 Directions for future research 
This dissertation analyzed some of the issues that affect producer prices of 
coffee. There are several related areas worth investigating in the future, both from the 
point of view of methodology to enhance the treatment of the problems outlined in 
this dissertation and addressing additional questions related to functioning of 
domestic coffee markets.  
In terms of methodology an obvious extension of the model presented in 
Chapter 3 would be to assume a more flexible form of the production function to 




prices. In this case the analysis will probably have to concentrate on deriving 
comparative static results for price elasticity and price transmission to facilitate 
construction of various tests, following an approach similar to the one developed by 
Holloway (1991), rather than assessing the explicit relationship between producer 
prices and world prices as it is done here. In Chapter 4, a further next step in 
assessing the risk aversion parameter would be to use numerical integration and 
introduce assumptions on the utility function to evaluate the risk aversion parameter 
numerically. In addition, an experiment involving lotteries would be useful to 
corroborate the findings on risk aversion among coffee growers in India.  
A number of model extensions could be pursued to further develop the model 
of oligopsonistic competition among market intermediaries. First, it would be 
interesting to model explicitly the behavior of traders, assumed to be exogenous in 
this dissertation. The market structure could be made endogenous, and entry of 
traders could be modeled by making specific assumptions, for example on the fixed 
costs in coffee trading. The presence of asymmetric information between traders and 
growers could also have implications for the market structure. The search costs 
associated with asymmetric information regarding the quality of coffee sold by 
different growers would affect the equilibrium. To analyze this type of interaction a 
model spatial competition among traders would need to be developed. Another 
possible extension is to disaggregate the downstream sector into various activities, for 
example transport, processing and exporting. The effect of vertical integration of 
these activities on producer prices and marketing margins would be an important 




make the selection of marketing channels by coffee growers endogenous. 
Furthermore, a related question is the extent of market power of the multinationals 
that trade coffee: an exploration into the joint effect of oligopsony in domestic 
markets and oligopoly in global markets on producer prices would be an interesting 
contribution. In short, enhancing the theoretical treatment of market structure and the 
underlining dynamics in domestic commodity markets based on industrial 
organization approach would be helpful in furthering the analysis of the problems 
outlined.  
To go further in the analysis of policies that affect coffee growers it would be 
useful to analyze the relationship between the market reforms in producing countries 
and the collapse of International Coffee Agreement (ICA). In many countries market 
liberalization took place as the same time as the ICA was abandoned, which in turn 
had important implications for the international price of coffee. An obvious question 
would therefore be whether the reforms contributed to the collapse of the Agreement 
and to the subsequent decline in the world price. A related issue is that of trade 
policy: Since market liberalization coincided with greater trade openness (for 
example, the countries that joined WTO were required to lower domestic tariffs on 
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